Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics

It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe American political science review Vol. 94; no. 1; pp. 117 - 129
Main Author McCarty, Nolan M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.03.2000
American Political Science Association
Subjects
Bargaining
Constituents
Cost benefit ratio
Decision making
Election districts
Elections
Executive branch
Executive power
Financial Policy
Fiscal Policy
Government Spending
Legislators
Legislatures
Negotiation
Policy Making
Political parties
Political science
Politics
Powers and duties
Preferences
Presidential powers
Presidential vetoes
Presidents
Separation of Powers
Universalism
Veto
Vetoes
Voting
United States
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Summary:It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims, I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium, stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive.
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ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.2307/2586384