Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our design allows analyzing the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil of ignorance subjects choose more equal distributions than in front of the veil, but only a minority acts according to m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of public economics Vol. 94; no. 11; pp. 1062 - 1066
Main Author Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.12.2010
Elsevier
SeriesJournal of Public Economics
Subjects
Distribution
Efficiency
Experiment
Experiments
Insurance
Maximin preferences
Preferences
Redistribution
Risk aversion
Social preferences
Veil of ignorance
Veil of ignorance Maximin preferences Experiment Redistribution Social preferences Efficiency
D63
Veil of ignorance
C99
D64
Redistribution
Efficiency
Experiment
Maximin preferences
Social preferences
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Summary:We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our design allows analyzing the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil of ignorance subjects choose more equal distributions than in front of the veil, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Many subjects prefer more equal allocations not only for insurance purposes but also due to impartial social preferences for equality. Our results imply that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences are compatible with any degree of risk aversion if impartial social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:0047-2727
1879-2316
DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.021