Sustaining cooperation through self-sorting The good, the bad, and the conditional
In four public-good game experiments, we study self-sorting as a means to facilitate cooperation in groups. When individuals can choose to join groups precommitted to charity, such groups sustain cooperation toward the group’s local public good. By eliciting subjects’ conditional contribution profil...
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Published in | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 116; no. 12; pp. 5299 - 5304 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
United States
National Academy of Sciences
19.03.2019
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | In four public-good game experiments, we study self-sorting as a means to facilitate cooperation in groups. When individuals can choose to join groups precommitted to charity, such groups sustain cooperation toward the group’s local public good. By eliciting subjects’ conditional contribution profiles, we find that subjects who prefer the charity groups have higher average conditional contribution levels but do not differ with respect to the slope of their profiles. The majority of subjects in both group types are conditional cooperators whose willingness to contribute is stimulated by generous group members but undermined by free-riders. Charity groups thus seem better able to sustain cooperation because they attract a greater number of more generous individuals, triggering generous responses by conditional cooperators. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 Edited by Simon A. Levin, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved June 28, 2018 (received for review March 1, 2018) Author contributions: K.E.H., K.A.B., K.N., and J.T.L. designed research, performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper. 1K.E.H., K.A.B., K.N., and J.T.L. contributed equally to this article. |
ISSN: | 0027-8424 1091-6490 1091-6490 |
DOI: | 10.1073/pnas.1802875115 |