Emissions reduction and pricing of supply chain under cap-and-trade and subsidy mechanisms

This paper explored how the government provides low-carbon subsidies for the manufacturers, retailers, and consumers in a secondary supply chain under cap-and-trade scheme. We calculated the best prices, emissions reductions, and the demands for common and low-carbon products when subsidizing each o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPloS one Vol. 17; no. 4; p. e0266413
Main Authors Miao, Wenqing, Zhu, Guohua, Shen, Bingliang, Kong, Demin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States Public Library of Science 01.04.2022
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:This paper explored how the government provides low-carbon subsidies for the manufacturers, retailers, and consumers in a secondary supply chain under cap-and-trade scheme. We calculated the best prices, emissions reductions, and the demands for common and low-carbon products when subsidizing each of the abovementioned market players. In particular, a comparative analysis of their equilibrium outcomes was made thereafter. The MATLAB simulation found that the optimal emissions reductions under the three subsidy modes were even and positively correlated to low-carbon subsidies, which, however, negatively correlated to the prices of both product types. Higher subsidies drove up demand for low-carbon products and dragged down that for common goods. But the prices of these products maintained the highest levels when consumers were subsidized; demand for common products was greater when subsidies went to retailers than to manufacturers or consumers, consequently generating the largest emissions and highest profits. When the subsidies were greater than [Formula: see text], all three subsidy modes saw a drop in total carbon emissions. That being so, the government should offer proper subsidies before seeing energy-saving progress.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0266413