Emissions reduction and pricing of supply chain under cap-and-trade and subsidy mechanisms
This paper explored how the government provides low-carbon subsidies for the manufacturers, retailers, and consumers in a secondary supply chain under cap-and-trade scheme. We calculated the best prices, emissions reductions, and the demands for common and low-carbon products when subsidizing each o...
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Published in | PloS one Vol. 17; no. 4; p. e0266413 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
United States
Public Library of Science
01.04.2022
Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper explored how the government provides low-carbon subsidies for the manufacturers, retailers, and consumers in a secondary supply chain under cap-and-trade scheme. We calculated the best prices, emissions reductions, and the demands for common and low-carbon products when subsidizing each of the abovementioned market players. In particular, a comparative analysis of their equilibrium outcomes was made thereafter. The MATLAB simulation found that the optimal emissions reductions under the three subsidy modes were even and positively correlated to low-carbon subsidies, which, however, negatively correlated to the prices of both product types. Higher subsidies drove up demand for low-carbon products and dragged down that for common goods. But the prices of these products maintained the highest levels when consumers were subsidized; demand for common products was greater when subsidies went to retailers than to manufacturers or consumers, consequently generating the largest emissions and highest profits. When the subsidies were greater than [Formula: see text], all three subsidy modes saw a drop in total carbon emissions. That being so, the government should offer proper subsidies before seeing energy-saving progress. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. |
ISSN: | 1932-6203 1932-6203 |
DOI: | 10.1371/journal.pone.0266413 |