Managers and students playing Cournot - evidence from duopoly and triopoly experiments

This article reports results from Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students and Malaysian managers. We find that Malaysian managers perform significantly more collusively than Malaysian students. We also find that country matters insof...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inApplied economics letters Vol. 18; no. 2; pp. 115 - 120
Main Authors Waichman, Israel, Requate, Till, Siang, Ch'ng Kean
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Taylor & Francis 01.02.2011
Taylor and Francis Journals
Taylor & Francis LLC
SeriesApplied Economics Letters
Subjects
Collusion
Duopoly
Economic analysis
Economic models
Experiments
Germany
International comparisons
Malaysia
Managers
Students
Studies
Malaysia
Germany
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This article reports results from Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students and Malaysian managers. We find that Malaysian managers perform significantly more collusively than Malaysian students. We also find that country matters insofar as German students perform significantly more collusively than their Malaysian counterparts.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:1350-4851
1466-4291
DOI:10.1080/13504850903442988