A New Philosophy for International Law

As many philosophers have pointed out, there is mystery in the bare assumption that promising creates obligation. How can an individual change his moral situation just by speaking a runic phrase? If we want to explain why promises do create moral obligations, we must point to different, more basic m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophy & public affairs Vol. 41; no. 1; pp. 2 - 30
Main Author DWORKIN, RONALD
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Hoboken, NJ Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2013
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
Wiley
Subjects
Conceptualization
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
International Law
Legal norms
Morality
Philosophical thought
Philosophy
Philosophy of law
Political philosophy
Sovereignty
Knowledge theory
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Summary:As many philosophers have pointed out, there is mystery in the bare assumption that promising creates obligation. How can an individual change his moral situation just by speaking a runic phrase? If we want to explain why promises do create moral obligations, we must point to different, more basic moral principles that a promise invokes. Philosophers have suggested a variety of such principles. We must look for similar, more basic principles within international law. Dworkin posits that if law is understood as a special part of political morality, and if it serves its community well, its doctrines will crystallize over time. Its roots in political morality will grow less prominent--though will be available when needed--in ordinary legal argument.
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ISSN:0048-3915
1088-4963
DOI:10.1111/papa.12008