Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: Experimental evidence

The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Su...

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Published inJournal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 423 - 432
Main Authors Kraemer, Carlo, Nöth, Markus, Weber, Martin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.03.2006
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.026

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Abstract The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Subjects observe predecessors’ decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze subjects’ information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity.
AbstractList The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Subjects observe predecessors' decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze subjects' information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Subjects observe predecessors’ decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze subjects’ information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity.
Author Weber, Martin
Nöth, Markus
Kraemer, Carlo
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  surname: Weber
  fullname: Weber, Martin
  organization: University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
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Keywords Information aggregation
Bayes’ rule
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Information acquisition
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SubjectTerms Acquisition
Bayes’ rule
Conformity
Costs
Cultural change
Decision analysis
Decision makers
Decision making
Economic equilibrium
Economic psychology
Experiment design
Heuristics
Information
Information acquisition
Information aggregation
Information management
Investment
Pay-off
Rationality
Studies
Title Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: Experimental evidence
URI https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.026
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