Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: Experimental evidence
The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Su...
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Published in | Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 423 - 432 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.03.2006
Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
Series | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0167-2681 1879-1751 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.026 |
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Abstract | The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Subjects observe predecessors’ decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze subjects’ information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity. |
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AbstractList | The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Subjects observe predecessors' decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze subjects' information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations, even though the information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which subjects decide in a random sequence. Subjects observe predecessors’ decisions and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze subjects’ information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity. |
Author | Weber, Martin Nöth, Markus Kraemer, Carlo |
Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Carlo surname: Kraemer fullname: Kraemer, Carlo organization: Universität Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany – sequence: 2 givenname: Markus surname: Nöth fullname: Nöth, Markus email: noeth@bank.BWL.uni-mannheim.de organization: LS Bankbetriebslehre, Universität Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany – sequence: 3 givenname: Martin surname: Weber fullname: Weber, Martin organization: University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany |
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Cites_doi | 10.1016/S0167-4870(00)00025-8 10.1007/BF01426213 10.1006/game.1995.1023 10.1162/105864001316907964 10.1086/261849 10.1111/0034-6527.00290 10.1111/1468-0297.00091 |
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Keywords | Information aggregation Bayes’ rule D8 Information acquisition C92 Heuristics |
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SubjectTerms | Acquisition Bayes’ rule Conformity Costs Cultural change Decision analysis Decision makers Decision making Economic equilibrium Economic psychology Experiment design Heuristics Information Information acquisition Information aggregation Information management Investment Pay-off Rationality Studies |
Title | Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: Experimental evidence |
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