Robust scoring rules

• Published in: Theoretical economics Vol. 15; no. 3; pp. 955 - 987
• Main Author: Tsakas, Elias
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New Haven, CT The Econometric Society 01.07.2020; John Wiley & Sons, Inc
• Subjects: Accuracy; Beliefs; C91; Costs; D81; D82; D83; D87; Economic theory; Elicitation; Incentives; Non-invasive belief elicitation; Noninvasive belief elicitation; Population; population beliefs; posterior-separability; prior beliefs; rational inattention; Shannon entropy

Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information tha...