A Cancelable Iris- and Steganography-Based User Authentication System for the Internet of Things

• Published in: Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) Vol. 19; no. 13; p. 2985
• Main Authors: Yang, Wencheng, Wang, Song, Hu, Jiankun, Ibrahim, Ahmed, Zheng, Guanglou, Macedo, Marcelo Jose, Johnstone, Michael N., Valli, Craig
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Switzerland MDPI AG 06.07.2019; MDPI
• Subjects: Architectural engineering; Biometric identification; Biometrics; cancelable; Data compression; Electrocardiography; feature data protection; International conferences; Internet of Things; iris; Researchers; Spread spectrum; steganography; Trust; Wireless networks; Australia; United States > US; Italy; feature data protection; iris; cancelable; steganography
• DOI: 10.3390/s19132985
• ISSN: 1424-8220

Remote user authentication for Internet of Things (IoT) devices is critical to IoT security, as it helps prevent unauthorized access to IoT networks. Biometrics is an appealing authentication technique due to its advantages over traditional password-based authentication. However, the protection of biometric data itself is also important, as original biometric data cannot be replaced or reissued if compromised. In this paper, we propose a cancelable iris- and steganography-based user authentication system to provide user authentication and secure the original iris data. Most of the existing cancelable iris biometric systems need a user-specific key to guide feature transformation, e.g., permutation or random projection, which is also known as key-dependent transformation. One issue associated with key-dependent transformations is that if the user-specific key is compromised, some useful information can be leaked and exploited by adversaries to restore the original iris feature data. To mitigate this risk, the proposed scheme enhances system security by integrating an effective information-hiding technique—steganography. By concealing the user-specific key, the threat of key exposure-related attacks, e.g., attacks via record multiplicity, can be defused, thus heightening the overall system security and complementing the protection offered by cancelable biometric techniques.