Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups

Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The firs...

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Published inJournal of development economics Vol. 107; pp. 65 - 83
Main Authors Giné, Xavier, Karlan, Dean S.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.03.2014
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
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Abstract Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in short-run or long-run default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
AbstractList Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in short-run or long-run default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in short-run or long-run default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in short-run or long-run default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] All rights reserved, Elsevier
Author Karlan, Dean S.
Giné, Xavier
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  organization: World Bank, USA
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Dean S.
  surname: Karlan
  fullname: Karlan, Dean S.
  email: dean.karlan@yale.edu
  organization: Yale University, USA
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Group lending
Group liability
Social capital
Access to finance
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Microfinance
Micro-enterprises
Informal economies
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Snippet Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive...
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StartPage 65
SubjectTerms Access to finance
Borrowing
Default
Development economics
Economic analysis
Financial services
Group lending
Group liability
Informal economies
Joint liability
Lending institutions
Liabilities
Liability
Loans
Micro-enterprises
Microfinance
Philippines
Repayments
Social capital
Studies
Title Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups
URI https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.11.003
https://www.proquest.com/docview/1504641124
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1515982312
Volume 107
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