Thick Concepts and the Moral Brain

Drawing on Williams’ distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects’ judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, t...

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Published inArchives européennes de sociologie. European journal of sociology. Vol. 52; no. 1; pp. 143 - 172
Main Author Abend, Gabriel
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.04.2011
Subjects
Abuse
Anthropologists
Behavioral neuroscience
Brain
Brain research
Conceptualization
Cultural institutions
Empiricism
Ethics
Ethics and moral life
Experiments
Exploitation
Historians
Human Dignity
INCLUDING AND EXCLUDING CITIZENS
Moral judgment
Moral psychology
Morale
Morality
Morals
Nervous system
Neurophilosophy
Neuropsychology
Neuroscience
Neurosciences
Physiology
Presuppositions
Psychologists
Psychology
Science
Scientists
Social psychology
Sociology
Sociology of knowledge and ethics
Sociology of knowledge and sociology of culture
Concepts éthiques profonds
Sociologie de la morale
Neuroscience
Tiefgründige ethische Konzepte
Psychologie moralische
Thick ethical concepts
Psychologie morale
Sociology of morality
Moral psychology
Soziologie der Moral
Conceptualization
Ethics
Morality
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Abstract Drawing on Williams’ distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects’ judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts – e.g., dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism – have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Reprenant la distinction de Williams entre concepts éthiques profonds et superficiels, l'auteur affirme que les neurosciences et la psychologie actuelle n'atteignent que la moralité superficielle. De fait les expériences traitent de jugements des sujets sur le juste, l'opportun et le permis, tous concepts superficiels. La nature et le façonnage des concepts profonds : dignité, intégrité, humanité, cruauté, mesquinerie, exploitation, fanatisme sont complètements absents des théories récentes de la moralité. Ce n'est pas un oubli mineur aisément réparable car les concepts profonds mettent à mal, bien plus que ne peuvent le faire les concepts superficiels, un pilier de la recherche expérimentale actuelle à savoir la croyance en une capacité morale câblée de façon universelle. Il est temps de faire appel aux psychologues et auxneuroscientifiques, autant qu'aux anthropologues, historiens et sociologues. Ausgehend von Williams Unterscheidung zwischen tiefgründigen und oberflächlichen ethischen Konzepten, behauptet der Autor, dass die Neurowissenschaften und die heutige Psychologie nur eine oberflächliche Moralität erreichen. In der Tat, die Erfahrungen handeln von Urteilen über das Richtige, das Opportune und das Erlaubte, alles oberflächliche Konzepte. Eigenart und Ausformung von tiefgründigen Konzepten (Würde, Unbestechlichkeit, Menschlichkeit, Gewalt, Neid, Ausnutzung, Fanatismus) fehlen gänzlich in aktuellen Moraltheorien. Wer dies übersieht, vergisst, dass die tiefgründigen Konzepte, weitaus mehr als die oberflächlichen, einen Grundpfeiler der heutigen experimentellen Forschung, nämlich den Glauben an eine universelle Moralfähigkeit, erschüttern. Beide Konzepte, profunde wie oberflächliche, müssen berücksichtigt und Beiträge von Psychologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie Anthropologen, Historikern und Soziologen hinzugezogen werden.
AbstractList Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects' judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts - e.g., dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism - have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists.Original Abstract: Reprenant la distinction de Williams entre concepts ethiques profonds et superficiels, l'auteur affirme que les neurosciences et la psychologie actuelle n'atteignent que la moralite superficielle. De fait les experiences traitent de jugements des sujets sur le juste, l'opportun et le permis, tous concepts superficiels. La nature et le faconnage des concepts profonds : dignite, integrite, humanite, cruaute, mesquinerie, exploitation, fanatisme sont completements absents des theories recentes de la moralite. Ce n'est pas un oubli mineur aisement reparable car les concepts profonds mettent a mal, bien plus que ne peuvent le faire les concepts superficiels, un pilier de la recherche experimentale actuelle a savoir la croyance en une capacite morale cablee de facon universelle. Il est temps de faire appel aux psychologues et auxneuroscientifiques, autant qu'aux anthropologues, historiens et sociologues.
Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects' judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts -- e.g., dignity integrity humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism -- have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Adapted from the source document.
Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects' judgments about Tightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts — e.g., dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism — have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Reprenant la distinction de Williams entre concepts éthiques profonds et superficiels, l'auteur affirme que les neurosciences et la psychologie actuelle n'atteignent que la moralité superficielle. De fait les expériences traitent de jugements des sujets sur le juste, l'opportun et le permis, tous concepts superficiels. La nature et le façonnage des concepts profonds : dignité, intégrité, humanité, cruauté, mesquinerie, exploitation, fanatisme sont complètements absents des théories récentes de la moralité. Ce n'est pas un oubli mineur aisément réparable car les concepts profonds mettent à mal, bien plus que ne peuvent le faire les concepts superficiels, un pilier de la recherche expérimentale actuelle à savoir la croyance en une capacité morale câblée de façon universelle. Il est temps de faire appel aux psychologues et auxneuroscientifiques, autant qu'aux anthropologues, historiens et sociologues. Ausgehend von Williams Unterscheidung zwischen tiefgründigen und oberflächlichen ethischen Konzepten, behauptet der Autor, dass die Neurowissenschaften und die heutige Psychologie nur eine oberflächliche Moralität erreichen. In der Tat, die Erfahrungen handeln von Urteilen über das Richtige, das Opportune und das Erlaubte, alles oberflächliche Konzepte. Eigenart und Ausformung von tiefgründigen Konzepten (Würde, Unbestechlichkeit, Menschlichkeit, Gewalt, Neid, Ausnutzung, Fanatismus) fehlen gänzlich in aktuellen Moraltheorien. Wer dies übersieht, vergisst, dass die tiefgründigen Konzepte, weitaus mehr als die oberflächlichen, einen Grundpfeiler der heutigen experimentellen Forschung, nämlich den Glauben an eine universelle Moralfähigkeit, erschüttern. Beide Konzepte, profunde wie oberflächliche, müssen berücksichtigt und Beiträge von Psychologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie Anthropologen, Historikern und Soziologen hinzugezogen werden.
Drawing on Williams’ distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects’ judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts – e.g. , dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism – have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Reprenant la distinction de Williams entre concepts éthiques profonds et superficiels, l'auteur affirme que les neurosciences et la psychologie actuelle n'atteignent que la moralité superficielle. De fait les expériences traitent de jugements des sujets sur le juste, l'opportun et le permis, tous concepts superficiels. La nature et le façonnage des concepts profonds : dignité, intégrité, humanité, cruauté, mesquinerie, exploitation, fanatisme sont complètements absents des théories récentes de la moralité. Ce n'est pas un oubli mineur aisément réparable car les concepts profonds mettent à mal, bien plus que ne peuvent le faire les concepts superficiels, un pilier de la recherche expérimentale actuelle à savoir la croyance en une capacité morale câblée de façon universelle. Il est temps de faire appel aux psychologues et auxneuroscientifiques, autant qu'aux anthropologues, historiens et sociologues. Ausgehend von Williams Unterscheidung zwischen tiefgründigen und oberflächlichen ethischen Konzepten, behauptet der Autor, dass die Neurowissenschaften und die heutige Psychologie nur eine oberflächliche Moralität erreichen. In der Tat, die Erfahrungen handeln von Urteilen über das Richtige, das Opportune und das Erlaubte, alles oberflächliche Konzepte. Eigenart und Ausformung von tiefgründigen Konzepten (Würde, Unbestechlichkeit, Menschlichkeit, Gewalt, Neid, Ausnutzung, Fanatismus) fehlen gänzlich in aktuellen Moraltheorien. Wer dies übersieht, vergisst, dass die tiefgründigen Konzepte, weitaus mehr als die oberflächlichen, einen Grundpfeiler der heutigen experimentellen Forschung, nämlich den Glauben an eine universelle Moralfähigkeit, erschüttern. Beide Konzepte, profunde wie oberflächliche, müssen berücksichtigt und Beiträge von Psychologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie Anthropologen, Historikern und Soziologen hinzugezogen werden.
Abstract Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects' judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts - e.g., dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism - have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Résumé Reprenant la distinction de Williams entre concepts éthiques profonds et superficiels, l'auteur affirme que les neurosciences et la psychologie actuelle n'atteignent que la moralité superficielle. De fait les expériences traitent de jugements des sujets sur le juste, l'opportun et le permis, tous concepts superficiels. La nature et le façonnage des concepts profonds : dignité, intégrité, humanité, cruauté, mesquinerie, exploitation, fanatisme sont complètements absents des théories récentes de la moralité. Ce n'est pas un oubli mineur aisément réparable car les concepts profonds mettent à mal, bien plus que ne peuvent le faire les concepts superficiels, un pilier de la recherche expérimentale actuelle à savoir la croyance en une capacité morale câblée de façon universelle. Il est temps de faire appel aux psychologues et auxneuroscientifiques, autant qu'aux anthropologues, historiens et sociologues. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Zusammenfassung Ausgehend von Williams Unterscheidung zwischen tiefgründigen und oberflächlichen ethischen Konzepten, behauptet der Autor, dass die Neurowissenschaften und die heutige Psychologie nur eine oberflächliche Moralität erreichen. In der Tat, die Erfahrungen handeln von Urteilen über das Richtige, das Opportune und das Erlaubte, alles oberflächliche Konzepte. Eigenart und Ausformung von tiefgründigen Konzepten (Würde, Unbestechlichkeit, Menschlichkeit, Gewalt, Neid, Ausnutzung, Fanatismus) fehlen gänzlich in aktuellen Moraltheorien. Wer dies übersieht, vergisst, dass die tiefgründigen Konzepte, weitaus mehr als die oberflächlichen, einen Grundpfeiler der heutigen experimentellen Forschung, nämlich den Glauben an eine universelle Moralfähigkeit, erschüttern. Beide Konzepte, profunde wie oberflächliche, müssen berücksichtigt und Beiträge von Psychologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie Anthropologen, Historikern und Soziologen hinzugezogen werden. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects' judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts - e.g., dignity integrity humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism - have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Adapted from the source document. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press. An electronic version of this article can be accessed via the internet at http://journals.cambridge.org
Drawing on Williams’ distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects’ judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts – e.g., dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism – have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists. Reprenant la distinction de Williams entre concepts éthiques profonds et superficiels, l'auteur affirme que les neurosciences et la psychologie actuelle n'atteignent que la moralité superficielle. De fait les expériences traitent de jugements des sujets sur le juste, l'opportun et le permis, tous concepts superficiels. La nature et le façonnage des concepts profonds : dignité, intégrité, humanité, cruauté, mesquinerie, exploitation, fanatisme sont complètements absents des théories récentes de la moralité. Ce n'est pas un oubli mineur aisément réparable car les concepts profonds mettent à mal, bien plus que ne peuvent le faire les concepts superficiels, un pilier de la recherche expérimentale actuelle à savoir la croyance en une capacité morale câblée de façon universelle. Il est temps de faire appel aux psychologues et auxneuroscientifiques, autant qu'aux anthropologues, historiens et sociologues. Ausgehend von Williams Unterscheidung zwischen tiefgründigen und oberflächlichen ethischen Konzepten, behauptet der Autor, dass die Neurowissenschaften und die heutige Psychologie nur eine oberflächliche Moralität erreichen. In der Tat, die Erfahrungen handeln von Urteilen über das Richtige, das Opportune und das Erlaubte, alles oberflächliche Konzepte. Eigenart und Ausformung von tiefgründigen Konzepten (Würde, Unbestechlichkeit, Menschlichkeit, Gewalt, Neid, Ausnutzung, Fanatismus) fehlen gänzlich in aktuellen Moraltheorien. Wer dies übersieht, vergisst, dass die tiefgründigen Konzepte, weitaus mehr als die oberflächlichen, einen Grundpfeiler der heutigen experimentellen Forschung, nämlich den Glauben an eine universelle Moralfähigkeit, erschüttern. Beide Konzepte, profunde wie oberflächliche, müssen berücksichtigt und Beiträge von Psychologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie Anthropologen, Historikern und Soziologen hinzugezogen werden.
Author Abend, Gabriel
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  fullname: Abend, Gabriel
  email: abend@nyu.edu
  organization: aDepartment of Sociology, New York University, New York [abend@nyu.edu]
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Issue 1
Keywords Concepts éthiques profonds
Sociologie de la morale
Neuroscience
Tiefgründige ethische Konzepte
Psychologie moralische
Thick ethical concepts
Psychologie morale
Sociology of morality
Moral psychology
Soziologie der Moral
Conceptualization
Ethics
Morality
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Snippet Drawing on Williams’ distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their...
Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their...
Abstract Drawing on Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly...
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SubjectTerms Abuse
Anthropologists
Behavioral neuroscience
Brain
Brain research
Conceptualization
Cultural institutions
Empiricism
Ethics
Ethics and moral life
Experiments
Exploitation
Historians
Human Dignity
INCLUDING AND EXCLUDING CITIZENS
Moral judgment
Moral psychology
Morale
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Physiology
Presuppositions
Psychologists
Psychology
Science
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Social psychology
Sociology
Sociology of knowledge and ethics
Sociology of knowledge and sociology of culture
Title Thick Concepts and the Moral Brain
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Volume 52
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