Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

• Published in: International studies quarterly Vol. 53; no. 4; pp. 1075 - 1094
• Main Authors: Bapat, Navin A., Clifton Morgan, T.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.12.2009; Wiley Periodicals, Inc
• Subjects: Chaos theory; Comparative analysis; Data analysis; Datasets; Economic sanctions; Economic theory; International cooperation; International relations; International sanctions; Multilateralism; Policy making; Political behaviour; Public goods; Saliency; Sanctions; Studies; Trade sanctions; Unilateralism; World order

Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the Familiar Haufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more oft...