A Multistate Outbreak of Serratia marcescens Bloodstream Infection Associated with Contaminated Intravenous Magnesium Sulfate from a Compounding Pharmacy

Background. In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstre...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inClinical infectious diseases Vol. 45; no. 5; pp. 527 - 533
Main Authors Sunenshine, Rebecca H., Tan, Esther T., Terashita, Dawn M., Jensen, Bette J., Kacica, Marilyn A., Sickbert-Bennett, Emily E., Noble-Wang, Judith A., Palmieri, Michael J., Bopp, Dianna J., Jernigan, Daniel B., Kazakova, Sophia, Bresnitz, Eddy A., Tan, Christina G., McDonald, L. Clifford
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago, IL The University of Chicago Press 01.09.2007
University of Chicago Press
Oxford University Press
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1058-4838
1537-6591
1537-6591
DOI10.1086/520664

Cover

Abstract Background. In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. Methods. A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Results. Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO4) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1–38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO4 from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO4 demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. Conclusions. A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO4 distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
AbstractList Background. In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. Methods. A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Results. Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO sub(4)) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO sub(4) from a single lot produced bycompounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO sub(4) demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. Conclusions. A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO sub(4) distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
Background . In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. Methods . A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Results . Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO4) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO4 from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO4 demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. Conclusions . A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO4 distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO...) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO... from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO... demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO... distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection. (ProQuest: ... denotes formulae/symbols omitted.)
In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO(4)) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO(4) from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO(4) demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO(4) distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
Background. In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. Methods. A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Results. Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO4) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1–38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO4 from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO4 demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. Conclusions. A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO4 distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
Background. In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. Methods. A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. Results. Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO₄) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO₄ from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO₄ demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. Conclusions. A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO₄ distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause.BACKGROUNDIn contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause.A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis.METHODSA matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis.Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO(4)) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO(4) from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO(4) demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X.RESULTSNationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO(4)) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO(4) from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO(4) demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X.A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO(4) distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.CONCLUSIONSA multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO(4) distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.
Author Palmieri, Michael J.
Sunenshine, Rebecca H.
Terashita, Dawn M.
Bopp, Dianna J.
McDonald, L. Clifford
Tan, Christina G.
Jensen, Bette J.
Kacica, Marilyn A.
Sickbert-Bennett, Emily E.
Noble-Wang, Judith A.
Tan, Esther T.
Bresnitz, Eddy A.
Jernigan, Daniel B.
Kazakova, Sophia
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Rebecca H.
  surname: Sunenshine
  fullname: Sunenshine, Rebecca H.
  email: Sunensr@azdhs.gov
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Esther T.
  surname: Tan
  fullname: Tan, Esther T.
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
– sequence: 3
  givenname: Dawn M.
  surname: Terashita
  fullname: Terashita, Dawn M.
  organization: Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Los Angeles, California
– sequence: 4
  givenname: Bette J.
  surname: Jensen
  fullname: Jensen, Bette J.
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
– sequence: 5
  givenname: Marilyn A.
  surname: Kacica
  fullname: Kacica, Marilyn A.
  organization: New York State Department of Health, Albany
– sequence: 6
  givenname: Emily E.
  surname: Sickbert-Bennett
  fullname: Sickbert-Bennett, Emily E.
  organization: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
– sequence: 7
  givenname: Judith A.
  surname: Noble-Wang
  fullname: Noble-Wang, Judith A.
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
– sequence: 8
  givenname: Michael J.
  surname: Palmieri
  fullname: Palmieri, Michael J.
  organization: Food and Drug Administration Northeast Regional Laboratory, Jamaica, New York
– sequence: 9
  givenname: Dianna J.
  surname: Bopp
  fullname: Bopp, Dianna J.
  organization: New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Laboratory, Albany
– sequence: 10
  givenname: Daniel B.
  surname: Jernigan
  fullname: Jernigan, Daniel B.
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
– sequence: 11
  givenname: Sophia
  surname: Kazakova
  fullname: Kazakova, Sophia
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
– sequence: 12
  givenname: Eddy A.
  surname: Bresnitz
  fullname: Bresnitz, Eddy A.
  organization: New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Trenton, New Jersey
– sequence: 13
  givenname: Christina G.
  surname: Tan
  fullname: Tan, Christina G.
  organization: New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Trenton, New Jersey
– sequence: 14
  givenname: L. Clifford
  surname: McDonald
  fullname: McDonald, L. Clifford
  organization: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
BackLink http://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=20290972$$DView record in Pascal Francis
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17682984$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed
BookMark eNqFkt9uFCEUxiemxv5Rn8AYaqJXjsIMMHC5bmx3Y5uarCYbbwjDQMt2BlZg1D6Kbyt1121SY7w6hO93DufwncNiz3mni-Ipgm8QZPQtqSCl-EFxgEjdlJRwtJfPkLASs5rtF4cxriBEiEHyqNhHDWUVZ_ig-DkB52OfbEwyaXAxpjZoeQ28AQsdgkxWgkEGpaPSLoJ3vfddTBkZwNwZrZL1Dkxi9Mrm_A58t-kKTL1LcrDu983cpSC_aefHCM7lpdPRjgNYjL25fdAEPwCZM4a1H11n3SX4eCXDINXN4-KhkX3UT7bxqPh88v7TdFaeXZzOp5OzUmECU4lQjVuCkCEtI8Q0qOtkJTHWuDMEt7wiujFtS6jhTUsYqzmUmHFOc-BZqY-KV5u66-C_jjomMdg8bd9Lp3PTgjKEaY2b_4IVZLghNc7gi3vgyo_B5SFEhTgnjJMqQ8-30NgOuhPrYPNH34g_1mTg5RaQUcneBOmUjTuughWHvKnu2lLBxxi0uSsFxe1uiM1uZPD1PVDZ7Hp2MDtk-7_x4w3ux_W_Sz7bMKuYfNhRGGcrIM1yuZHzeukfO1mGa0GbuiFitvwiCFuczpYnS_Gh_gVCINz4
CODEN CIDIEL
CitedBy_id crossref_primary_10_3390_microorganisms3040746
crossref_primary_10_1097_PTS_0000000000000188
crossref_primary_10_5863_1551_6776_14_1_25
crossref_primary_10_1086_599376
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ajic_2013_01_033
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1440_172X_2011_01994_x
crossref_primary_10_1177_0148607111435333
crossref_primary_10_2146_ajhp130049
crossref_primary_10_3201_eid1501_070616
crossref_primary_10_7759_cureus_48957
crossref_primary_10_3390_diagnostics12092180
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ajic_2010_08_020
crossref_primary_10_1007_s00044_012_0427_x
crossref_primary_10_1017_ice_2019_196
crossref_primary_10_1097_MRM_0b013e328365c506
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jhin_2010_12_017
crossref_primary_10_1007_s13181_020_00814_3
crossref_primary_10_1128_JCM_00944_13
crossref_primary_10_1056_NEJMoa1212972
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ajo_2011_11_023
crossref_primary_10_4274_hamidiyemedj_galenos_2023_55477
crossref_primary_10_1093_cid_ciu218
crossref_primary_10_1128_JCM_00160_13
crossref_primary_10_1086_597383
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_apmr_2009_05_018
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_eimc_2012_10_010
crossref_primary_10_1177_20499361221078116
crossref_primary_10_3389_fmicb_2018_00828
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijid_2013_02_012
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijid_2014_02_013
crossref_primary_10_1128_CMR_00017_11
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_tjo_2012_07_002
crossref_primary_10_1136_ejhpharm_2015_000769
crossref_primary_10_2146_ajhp130112
crossref_primary_10_1128_CMR_00234_20
crossref_primary_10_7326_aimcc_2024_0108
crossref_primary_10_1155_2018_5903589
crossref_primary_10_2146_ajhp150141
crossref_primary_10_3390_nu4101490
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ajic_2016_01_029
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jhin_2009_01_010
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jhin_2014_09_013
crossref_primary_10_3390_ijerph16040610
crossref_primary_10_3201_eid1501_081054
crossref_primary_10_2169_internalmedicine_51_6648
Cites_doi 10.1345/aph.1C508
10.1093/ajhp/61.18.1928
10.1128/JCM.25.6.1014-1018.1987
10.1086/647728
10.1128/JCM.33.9.2233-2239.1995
10.1542/peds.2005-2617
10.1164/ajrccm/139.4.1058
10.1056/NEJM200105173442001
10.1086/501743
10.1016/S0076-6879(96)70013-7
10.1016/S0140-6736(81)92317-5
10.1128/JCM.43.10.5316-5318.2005
10.1128/JCM.25.6.1019-1021.1987
10.1086/514008
10.1053/jhin.1999.0722
10.1016/S0002-9343(01)01032-4
ContentType Journal Article
Copyright Copyright 2007 The Infectious Diseases Society of America
2007 Infectious Diseases Society of America 2007
2008 INIST-CNRS
Copyright University of Chicago, acting through its Press Sep 1, 2007
Copyright_xml – notice: Copyright 2007 The Infectious Diseases Society of America
– notice: 2007 Infectious Diseases Society of America 2007
– notice: 2008 INIST-CNRS
– notice: Copyright University of Chicago, acting through its Press Sep 1, 2007
DBID BSCLL
AAYXX
CITATION
IQODW
CGR
CUY
CVF
ECM
EIF
NPM
7QL
7T2
7T7
7U7
7U9
8FD
C1K
FR3
H94
K9.
M7N
P64
7X8
DOI 10.1086/520664
DatabaseName Istex
CrossRef
Pascal-Francis
Medline
MEDLINE
MEDLINE (Ovid)
MEDLINE
MEDLINE
PubMed
Bacteriology Abstracts (Microbiology B)
Health and Safety Science Abstracts (Full archive)
Industrial and Applied Microbiology Abstracts (Microbiology A)
Toxicology Abstracts
Virology and AIDS Abstracts
Technology Research Database
Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management
Engineering Research Database
AIDS and Cancer Research Abstracts
ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)
Algology Mycology and Protozoology Abstracts (Microbiology C)
Biotechnology and BioEngineering Abstracts
MEDLINE - Academic
DatabaseTitle CrossRef
MEDLINE
Medline Complete
MEDLINE with Full Text
PubMed
MEDLINE (Ovid)
Virology and AIDS Abstracts
Technology Research Database
Toxicology Abstracts
Bacteriology Abstracts (Microbiology B)
Algology Mycology and Protozoology Abstracts (Microbiology C)
AIDS and Cancer Research Abstracts
ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)
Health & Safety Science Abstracts
Engineering Research Database
Industrial and Applied Microbiology Abstracts (Microbiology A)
Biotechnology and BioEngineering Abstracts
Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management
MEDLINE - Academic
DatabaseTitleList Bacteriology Abstracts (Microbiology B)

Virology and AIDS Abstracts
MEDLINE


MEDLINE - Academic
Database_xml – sequence: 1
  dbid: NPM
  name: PubMed
  url: https://proxy.k.utb.cz/login?url=http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=PubMed
  sourceTypes: Index Database
– sequence: 2
  dbid: EIF
  name: MEDLINE
  url: https://proxy.k.utb.cz/login?url=https://www.webofscience.com/wos/medline/basic-search
  sourceTypes: Index Database
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Medicine
EISSN 1537-6591
EndPage 533
ExternalDocumentID 1317989331
17682984
20290972
10_1086_520664
10.1086/520664
4485506
ark_67375_HXZ_58SGHXFX_K
Genre Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S
Journal Article
Feature
GeographicLocations United States
Los Angeles
New Jersey
Los Angeles California
GeographicLocations_xml – name: Los Angeles
– name: New Jersey
– name: United States
– name: Los Angeles California
GroupedDBID ---
..I
.2P
.I3
.ZR
08P
0R~
1TH
29B
2AX
2WC
36B
4.4
48X
53G
5GY
5RE
5VS
5WD
6J9
AABZA
AACGO
AACZT
AAJKP
AAJQQ
AAMVS
AANCE
AAOGV
AAPQZ
AAPXW
AAQQT
AARHZ
AAUAY
AAUQX
AAVAP
ABBHK
ABDFA
ABEJV
ABEUO
ABGNP
ABIXL
ABJNI
ABLJU
ABNGD
ABNHQ
ABOCM
ABPLY
ABPQP
ABPTD
ABQLI
ABQNK
ABTLG
ABVGC
ABWST
ABXSQ
ABXVV
ACGFO
ACGFS
ACHIC
ACPRK
ACUFI
ACUKT
ACUTJ
ACUTO
ACYHN
ADBBV
ADGZP
ADHKW
ADHZD
ADIPN
ADNBA
ADQBN
ADQXQ
ADRTK
ADULT
ADVEK
ADYVW
ADZXQ
AEGPL
AEGXH
AEJOX
AEKSI
AEMDU
AEMQT
AENEX
AENZO
AEPUE
AETBJ
AEUPB
AEWNT
AEXZC
AFFNX
AFFZL
AFIYH
AFOFC
AFRAH
AFXAL
AGINJ
AGORE
AGQPQ
AGQXC
AGSYK
AGUTN
AHMBA
AHMMS
AHXPO
AIAGR
AJBYB
AJEEA
AJNCP
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
ALUQC
ALXQX
APIBT
APWMN
AQKUS
AQVQM
ASPBG
ATGXG
AVWKF
AXUDD
AZFZN
BAWUL
BAYMD
BCRHZ
BEYMZ
BHONS
BSCLL
BTRTY
BVRKM
C1A
C45
CDBKE
CS3
CZ4
DAKXR
DCCCD
DIK
DILTD
DU5
D~K
E3Z
EBS
EE~
EJD
EMOBN
ENERS
F5P
F9B
FECEO
FEDTE
FLUFQ
FOEOM
FOTVD
FQBLK
GAUVT
GJXCC
H5~
HAR
HQ3
HTVGU
HVGLF
HW0
HZ~
IOX
IPSME
J21
J5H
JAAYA
JBMMH
JENOY
JHFFW
JKQEH
JLS
JLXEF
JPM
JSG
JST
JXSIZ
KAQDR
KBUDW
KOP
KSI
KSN
L7B
MHKGH
MJL
ML0
N4W
N9A
NGC
NOMLY
NOYVH
NU-
NVLIB
O0~
O9-
OAUYM
OAWHX
OCZFY
ODMLO
ODZKP
OJQWA
OJZSN
OK1
OPAEJ
OVD
OWPYF
P2P
P6G
PAFKI
PB-
PEELM
PQQKQ
Q1.
Q5Y
QBD
RD5
ROX
ROZ
RUSNO
RW1
RXO
SA0
SJN
TCURE
TEORI
TJX
TMA
TR2
W8F
X7H
YAYTL
YKOAZ
YXANX
~91
~S-
AAYOK
AASNB
ADACV
ADJQC
ADRIX
AFXEN
DOOOF
ESX
JSODD
M49
AAYXX
CITATION
.GJ
1KJ
3O-
70D
AAPGJ
AAPNW
AAWDT
ABKDP
ABNKS
ABSMQ
ABZBJ
ACFRR
ACPQN
ACVCV
ACZBC
ADEYI
ADMTO
ADOCK
AEKPW
AFFQV
AFSHK
AFYAG
AGKEF
AGKRT
AGMDO
AHGBF
AI.
AIJHB
AJDVS
APJGH
AQDSO
AVNTJ
BZKNY
EIHJH
H13
IQODW
MBLQV
OBFPC
O~Y
VH1
Y6R
ZGI
CGR
CUY
CVF
ECM
EIF
NPM
7QL
7T2
7T7
7U7
7U9
8FD
C1K
FR3
H94
K9.
M7N
P64
7X8
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-c450t-1134b511f5b855f71dda2a44e4df54b925e7fbb56f97b588390a489960a497fb3
ISSN 1058-4838
1537-6591
IngestDate Fri Sep 05 08:07:15 EDT 2025
Thu Sep 04 19:37:10 EDT 2025
Fri Jul 25 03:53:40 EDT 2025
Thu Apr 03 07:10:41 EDT 2025
Mon Jul 21 09:15:12 EDT 2025
Thu Apr 24 22:58:07 EDT 2025
Tue Jul 01 04:28:53 EDT 2025
Wed Sep 11 04:51:00 EDT 2024
Thu Jun 19 15:26:24 EDT 2025
Tue Aug 05 16:49:49 EDT 2025
IsPeerReviewed true
IsScholarly true
Issue 5
Keywords Infection
Epidemic
Intravenous administration
Serratia marcescens
Bacteriosis
Bacteria
Magnesium
Inorganic element
Bacteremia
Contamination
Enterobacteriaceae
Language English
License CC BY 4.0
LinkModel OpenURL
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c450t-1134b511f5b855f71dda2a44e4df54b925e7fbb56f97b588390a489960a497fb3
Notes ark:/67375/HXZ-58SGHXFX-K
istex:5FCA3A2FA841D0BB84E1458C0507BB1661A9066D
R.H.S. and E.T.T. were joint first authors of this article.
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
PMID 17682984
PQID 219958952
PQPubID 48300
PageCount 7
ParticipantIDs proquest_miscellaneous_68146347
proquest_miscellaneous_20847534
proquest_journals_219958952
pubmed_primary_17682984
pascalfrancis_primary_20290972
crossref_primary_10_1086_520664
crossref_citationtrail_10_1086_520664
oup_primary_10_1086_520664
jstor_primary_4485506
istex_primary_ark_67375_HXZ_58SGHXFX_K
ProviderPackageCode CITATION
AAYXX
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 2007-09-01
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2007-09-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 09
  year: 2007
  text: 2007-09-01
  day: 01
PublicationDecade 2000
PublicationPlace Chicago, IL
PublicationPlace_xml – name: Chicago, IL
– name: United States
– name: Oxford
PublicationTitle Clinical infectious diseases
PublicationTitleAbbrev Clinical Infectious Diseases
PublicationTitleAlternate Clinical Infectious Diseases
PublicationYear 2007
Publisher The University of Chicago Press
University of Chicago Press
Oxford University Press
Publisher_xml – name: The University of Chicago Press
– name: University of Chicago Press
– name: Oxford University Press
References Perz (5_19453003) 2005; 43
Wrestler (17_16394552) 1996; 270
Kastango (2_18474172) 2004; 61
(15_38760688) 1997; 175
(3_17400211) 2002; 51
Allen (22_17836061) 2003; 37
Nakashima (10_14179789) 1987; 25
Sartor (13_6528304) 2000; 21
Nakashima (11_14179788) 1987; 25
Tenover (18_16037533) 1995; 33
Jones (6_16888365) 2002; 112
Hejazi (14_10337129) 2000; 45
Vigeant (12_6212819) 1998; 19
Grohskopf (8_11136615) 2001; 344
(7_22281807) 2006; 118
Ehrenkranz (9_8377842) 1981; 1
(16_5199377) 1989; 139
References_xml – volume: 37
  start-page: 1526
  issn: 0012-6578
  issue: 10
  year: 2003
  ident: 22_17836061
  publication-title: The Annals of Pharmacotherapy
  doi: 10.1345/aph.1C508
– volume: 61
  start-page: 1928
  issn: 1079-2082
  issue: 18
  year: 2004
  ident: 2_18474172
  publication-title: American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy
  doi: 10.1093/ajhp/61.18.1928
– volume: 51
  start-page: 1109
  issn: 0149-2195
  issue: 49
  year: 2002
  ident: 3_17400211
  publication-title: MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report
– volume: 25
  start-page: 1014
  issn: 0095-1137
  issue: 6
  year: 1987
  ident: 11_14179788
  publication-title: Journal of Clinical Microbiology
  doi: 10.1128/JCM.25.6.1014-1018.1987
– volume: 19
  start-page: 791
  issn: 0899-823X
  issue: 10
  year: 1998
  ident: 12_6212819
  publication-title: Infection control and hospital epidemiology : the official journal of the Society of Hospital Epidemiologists of America
  doi: 10.1086/647728
– volume: 33
  start-page: 2233
  issn: 0095-1137
  issue: 9
  year: 1995
  ident: 18_16037533
  publication-title: Journal of Clinical Microbiology
  doi: 10.1128/JCM.33.9.2233-2239.1995
– volume: 118
  start-page: e212
  issn: 0031-4005
  issue: 1
  year: 2006
  ident: 7_22281807
  publication-title: Pediatrics
  doi: 10.1542/peds.2005-2617
– volume: 139
  start-page: 1058
  issn: 0003-0805
  issue: 4
  year: 1989
  ident: 16_5199377
  publication-title: The American review of respiratory disease
  doi: 10.1164/ajrccm/139.4.1058
– volume: 344
  start-page: 1491
  issn: 0028-4793
  issue: 20
  year: 2001
  ident: 8_11136615
  publication-title: New England Journal of Medicine
  doi: 10.1056/NEJM200105173442001
– volume: 21
  start-page: 196
  issn: 0899-823X
  issue: 3
  year: 2000
  ident: 13_6528304
  publication-title: Infection control and hospital epidemiology : the official journal of the Society of Hospital Epidemiologists of America
  doi: 10.1086/501743
– volume: 270
  start-page: 255
  issn: 0076-6879
  year: 1996
  ident: 17_16394552
  publication-title: Methods in enzymology
  doi: 10.1016/S0076-6879(96)70013-7
– volume: 1
  start-page: 1154
  issn: 0140-6736
  issue: 8230
  year: 1981
  ident: 9_8377842
  publication-title: Lancet
  doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(81)92317-5
– volume: 43
  start-page: 5316
  issn: 0095-1137
  issue: 10
  year: 2005
  ident: 5_19453003
  publication-title: Journal of Clinical Microbiology
  doi: 10.1128/JCM.43.10.5316-5318.2005
– volume: 25
  start-page: 1019
  issn: 0095-1137
  issue: 6
  year: 1987
  ident: 10_14179789
  publication-title: Journal of Clinical Microbiology
  doi: 10.1128/JCM.25.6.1019-1021.1987
– volume: 175
  start-page: 992
  issn: 0022-1899
  issue: 4
  year: 1997
  ident: 15_38760688
  publication-title: Journal of Infectious Diseases
  doi: 10.1086/514008
– volume: 45
  start-page: 42
  issn: 0195-6701
  issue: 1
  year: 2000
  ident: 14_10337129
  publication-title: The Journal of hospital infection
  doi: 10.1053/jhin.1999.0722
– volume: 112
  start-page: 31
  issn: 0002-9343
  issue: 1
  year: 2002
  ident: 6_16888365
  publication-title: The American journal of medicine
  doi: 10.1016/S0002-9343(01)01032-4
SSID ssj0011805
Score 2.1452758
Snippet Background. In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the...
Background . In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the...
In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of...
SourceID proquest
pubmed
pascalfrancis
crossref
oup
jstor
istex
SourceType Aggregation Database
Index Database
Enrichment Source
Publisher
StartPage 527
SubjectTerms Adolescent
Adult
Aged
Aged, 80 and over
Articles and Commentaries
Bacteremia - epidemiology
Bacteremia - microbiology
Bacteria
Bacterial diseases
Bacterial sepsis
Biological and medical sciences
Blood
Cardiac Surgical Procedures
Cardiovascular Agents - adverse effects
Case studies
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.) - statistics & numerical data
Cross Infection - epidemiology
Cross Infection - microbiology
Disease control
Disease Outbreaks
Drug Compounding - adverse effects
Drug Compounding - standards
Drug Contamination
Epidemics
Female
Human bacterial diseases
Humans
Infections
Infectious diseases
Los Angeles - epidemiology
Magnesium
Magnesium Sulfate - adverse effects
Male
Medical sciences
Medication administration
Medications
Middle Aged
New Jersey - epidemiology
Operating rooms
Pharmaceuticals
Pharmacies
Preventive medicine
Risk Factors
Serratia Infections - epidemiology
Serratia Infections - etiology
Serratia marcescens
Serratia marcescens - isolation & purification
Serratia marcescens - pathogenicity
Sulfates
United States
Title A Multistate Outbreak of Serratia marcescens Bloodstream Infection Associated with Contaminated Intravenous Magnesium Sulfate from a Compounding Pharmacy
URI https://api.istex.fr/ark:/67375/HXZ-58SGHXFX-K/fulltext.pdf
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4485506
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17682984
https://www.proquest.com/docview/219958952
https://www.proquest.com/docview/20847534
https://www.proquest.com/docview/68146347
Volume 45
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV1db9MwFLXKJiEkhPgYkA02PwAvUasmsePksYyNblMBiU6qeInsxkGILZvaFBD_hD_Bb-ReO3EyjSLgpaps101yT66v7XOPCXmmVMQ1DHN9ISF8g_E26CuYafUDBZ4wUlLkKSY4T97E41N2POOzXu9nh7W0qtRg_v23eSX_Y1UoA7tiluw_WNZ1CgXwHewLn2Bh-PwrG498kz9rkoL8t3BHEAEaojh4ALSs9FGpwgg2Lf2XSFHH1BB5Dl7BUrBKZ56GhY5qVRLpMVhyhCu_X6yK60R-BK_4aXUOvuaswD80mSnSeBQ8mwnXHN5ZIewrW8X7Te5lw_uCzuptoZZnb43sjwfQe6mRQtZu9x8sMUj1pwN_2kL5lfxa-hMo0gs8Dqpq1xWQu-QfD5C3s6zz3JpVDeFoW1VHIfdPrBR01kNuFkOTrje34pQ1annHNXOrQVCP8tzKb1wbQIZmP4ujyD1rh0hHXGRGAC6-QTZDISwt4OjE7VoFiaHMuuvqnGVle7wS_Gzie_yt4cE2CZa3L-USbFLYY1XWz3tM_DO9S-7UExc6sii8R3q6vE9uTmpqxgPyY0RbMNIGjPSioA0YaQtG2gEjdWCkLRgpgpF2wUg7YKQOjLQGI0UwUkk7YKQNGLfI6eHBdH_cr8_96M8ZH1b9IIiYgolAwRU87UIEeS5DyZhmecGZSkOuRaEUj4tUKJ5AiD-ULEGZIclSqIkeko3yotSPkbgXSaVlIKSEunyucgjawijVUaGRQ-CR541Bsnktio9ns5xlhpyRxJk1nEf2XLtLKwNzrcULY09XLRefkTQpeDaefch48v71eHY4y048smUM7hrWmPLINgBgbe-7V3DhmoXDMEUFLo_sNEDJag-1zELUX0hSDrV7rhaGD9wTlKUGe8HvITzlEVvfIsZNgogJjzyy-GsvUcTwCBO2veaOdsit9tV-QjaqxUo_hRC-UrvmvfkF61r5tg
linkProvider Flying Publisher
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A+Multistate+Outbreak+of+Serratia+marcescens+Bloodstream+Infection+Associated+with+Contaminated+Intravenous+Magnesium+Sulfate+from+a+Compounding+Pharmacy&rft.jtitle=Clinical+infectious+diseases&rft.au=Rebecca+H.+Sunenshine&rft.au=Esther+T.+Tan&rft.au=Dawn+M.+Terashita&rft.au=Bette+J.+Jensen&rft.date=2007-09-01&rft.pub=University+of+Chicago+Press&rft.issn=1058-4838&rft.volume=45&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=527&rft.epage=533&rft_id=info:doi/10.1086%2F520664&rft.externalDocID=4485506
thumbnail_l http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=1058-4838&client=summon
thumbnail_m http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=1058-4838&client=summon
thumbnail_s http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=1058-4838&client=summon