Optimal contract under brand name collaboration

• Published in: Economic modelling Vol. 37; pp. 238 - 240
• Main Authors: Basak, Debasmita, Mukherjee, Arijit
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.02.2014; Elsevier Science Ltd
• Subjects: Brand name collaboration; Brand names; Brands; Collaboration; Duopoly; Economic theory; Exports; Fixed-fee; Foreign direct investment; International trade; Royalties; Royalty; Studies; Willingness to pay; D43; Fixed-fee; Royalty; D45; Brand name collaboration

In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of fixed-fee and output royalty. We show that the firms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive f...