The Psychological Reality of Reasons

• Published in: Ratio (Oxford) Vol. 10; no. 2; pp. 108 - 123
• Main Author: Collins, Arthur W.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 01.09.1997; Blackwell; Basil Blackwell Ltd
• Subjects: Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language; Philosophy; Belief; Agent; Objective; Action; Perspective; Statement;Utterance; Explanation; Circumstance; Representation; Reason
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00033
• ISSN: 0034-0006

Action explanations like ‘I am heading to the ferry because the bridge is closed,’ are supposed to require restatement: ‘I am . . . because I believe the bridge is closed,’ because (i) the objective claim may be false though the intended explanation is correct, and (ii) because objective circumstances have to be cognitively mediated if they are to bear on action. This supposition is rejected here. Restatements cannot withdraw the objective claim without withdrawing the explanation. In the context of reason‐giving, belief statements do not function as assertions about the inner life. The fact that belief statements may be true though the belief itself is false creates the illusion of distinctive subject matters. The illusion is exploited by conceptions of belief positing stored representations. Even if there were such representations, retrieved for the sake of expressing previously acquired beliefs, the expression of belief must endorse p and cannot merely advert to the existence and content of a representation. The reverse of the standard philosophical view about restatement is actually correct. Wherever an agent correctly adduces a belief that an objective circumstance obtains in explaining his action, a de‐psychologizing restatement that merely makes the objective claim must be ascribable to the agent.