Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty

• Published in: Computational economics Vol. 61; no. 3; pp. 905 - 935
• Main Authors: Xu, Hao, Tan, Deqing
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer US 01.03.2023; Springer; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Air pollution; Analysis; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Climate change; Computer Appl. in Social and Behavioral Sciences; Control theory; Cooperation; Costs (Law); Differential games; Economic models; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Emissions; Equilibrium; Fees & charges; Game theory; Industrialized nations; Licenses; Licensing; Licensing (technology); Math Applications in Computer Science; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Optimization; Pollutants; Pollution; Revenue; Royalty; Taxation; Technology; Technology transfer; Transboundary pollution; Royalty licensing; Transboundary pollution; Fixed-fee licensing; Abatement technology; Differential games

Transboundary pollution poses a major threat to environment and human health. An effective approach to addressing this problem is the adoption of long-term abatement technology; however, many developing regions are lacking in related technologies that can be acquired by licensing from developed regi...