The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment
Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfa...
Saved in:
Published in | Evolution and human behavior Vol. 29; no. 4; pp. 242 - 248 |
---|---|
Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Elsevier Inc
01.07.2008
|
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Abstract | Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. |
---|---|
AbstractList | Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. All rights reserved, Elsevier Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Inc.] |
Author | Nelissen, Rob M.A |
Author_xml | – sequence: 1 fullname: Nelissen, Rob M.A |
BookMark | eNqNkU9v1DAQxS1UJNrCd4g4cEuYSezE6QEJlb9SUQ9tz5bjTLResnawnZX229fRckBc4DRzeO9p5veu2IXzjhh7i1AhYPt-X9HRz7v1MNBOH6saQFaAFQC-YJcou76EFrqLvEMPpcBGvmJXMe4BgHPRX7IfjzsqlmANFSe_Fos-3RTGx1SOtJAbyaUi0LImnax3BU0TmRQLPxV6TmG1MVlTLKuzcXfI2tfs5aTnSG9-z2v29OXz4-238u7-6_fbj3el4RxT2TTIpYQhnwnt0EiJZpIDTIIPUgjRmxG10J3gHQ66rbsGeqkFYqcnbpoBmmv27py7BP9rpZjUwUZD86wd-TWqFjsAwfGfwqbtsW7rTXhzFprgYww0qQzloMNJIagNtdqrP1GrDbUCVPmHbP50NlP--WgpqGgsOUOjDZmXGr39v5gPf8WY2Tpr9PyTThT3fg0uU1WoYq1APWydbpWCzHVCK5tnPeykqQ |
CODEN | EHBEFF |
CitedBy_id | crossref_primary_10_1007_s11211_012_0157_8 crossref_primary_10_3389_fpsyg_2021_681664 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2969063 crossref_primary_10_2147_PRBM_S415959 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_obhdp_2021_01_003 crossref_primary_10_1080_20445911_2016_1138961 crossref_primary_10_1007_s13752_012_0016_8 crossref_primary_10_1017_ehs_2021_35 crossref_primary_10_1093_sf_soad073 crossref_primary_10_1177_1088868316657965 crossref_primary_10_1038_nature16981 crossref_primary_10_1177_1368430218806056 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jesp_2023_104477 crossref_primary_10_1177_2378023120967199 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2022_10_002 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jecp_2024_105894 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_joep_2017_07_003 crossref_primary_10_3389_fpsyg_2022_794953 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jtbi_2017_03_006 crossref_primary_10_1027_1864_9335_a000342 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_cognition_2019_104040 crossref_primary_10_1038_s44271_024_00092_7 crossref_primary_10_1111_spc3_12756 crossref_primary_10_1177_1474704916658042 crossref_primary_10_1073_pnas_2302475120 crossref_primary_10_1111_evo_12637 crossref_primary_10_1177_09567976211054786 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0140525X11001336 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_cognition_2020_104374 crossref_primary_10_1111_bjso_12687 crossref_primary_10_2117_psysoc_2011_27 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0140525X11000884 crossref_primary_10_3389_fpsyg_2023_1198797 crossref_primary_10_1556_JEP_7_2009_4_1 crossref_primary_10_1007_s11031_023_10041_2 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_tree_2014_12_003 crossref_primary_10_1126_sciadv_abg5902 crossref_primary_10_1098_rspb_2012_2723 crossref_primary_10_1177_0956797616685771 crossref_primary_10_1111_spc3_12581 crossref_primary_10_1177_08902070241256142 crossref_primary_10_1093_cercor_bhae048 crossref_primary_10_1371_journal_pone_0110045 crossref_primary_10_1177_1745691613488533 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_cognition_2022_105215 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_amc_2019_124945 crossref_primary_10_1098_rspb_2021_1773 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2015_12_003 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jesp_2019_03_011 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3080990 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10551_020_04664_5 crossref_primary_10_1177_09567976241227411 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2010_03_003 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2010_03_001 crossref_primary_10_1002_ab_21589 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_tics_2023_06_005 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jtbi_2017_04_004 crossref_primary_10_1038_s41598_024_57842_0 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijpsycho_2022_03_013 crossref_primary_10_1080_10463283_2017_1375662 crossref_primary_10_1038_ncomms12288 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jenvp_2020_101441 crossref_primary_10_1007_s12144_022_03395_2 crossref_primary_10_1002_evan_20224 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_copsyc_2022_101404 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2794084 crossref_primary_10_1002_cb_2042 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_cognition_2016_04_011 crossref_primary_10_1007_s11238_022_09897_6 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0140525X11002160 crossref_primary_10_1177_00483931231181168 crossref_primary_10_1007_s40806_020_00235_z crossref_primary_10_12677_AP_2021_117184 crossref_primary_10_1098_rstb_2020_0303 crossref_primary_10_1038_s41598_019_40909_8 crossref_primary_10_1007_s12144_023_05071_5 crossref_primary_10_1177_147470491201000509 crossref_primary_10_1177_0170840610372202 crossref_primary_10_1027_1864_9335_a000493 |
Cites_doi | 10.1073/pnas.0630443100 10.1038/415424a 10.1126/science.1133755 10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001 10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 10.1016/S0169-5347(00)02077-2 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5 10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 10.1086/468061 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 10.1038/nature05229 10.1038/nature04131 10.1038/nature02043 10.1017/S0140525X02000092 10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.010 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3 10.1007/s12110-998-1009-y 10.1177/0146167206291006 10.1111/1467-8721.00173 10.1038/nature02978 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.04.002 10.1017/S0140525X04000123 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.01.003 10.1037/h0071663 10.1086/427115 10.1038/415137a 10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 10.1006/game.1994.1056 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964 10.1006/game.1995.1027 10.1086/406755 10.1177/0539018405058203 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 10.1093/beheco/14.1.116 |
ContentType | Journal Article |
Copyright | Elsevier Inc. 2008 Elsevier Inc. |
Copyright_xml | – notice: Elsevier Inc. – notice: 2008 Elsevier Inc. |
DBID | AAYXX CITATION 8BJ FQK JBE 7U4 BHHNA DWI WZK |
DOI | 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001 |
DatabaseName | CrossRef International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences International Bibliography of the Social Sciences Sociological Abstracts (pre-2017) Sociological Abstracts Sociological Abstracts Sociological Abstracts (Ovid) |
DatabaseTitle | CrossRef International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) Sociological Abstracts (pre-2017) Sociological Abstracts |
DatabaseTitleList | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) Sociological Abstracts (pre-2017) |
DeliveryMethod | fulltext_linktorsrc |
Discipline | Zoology Psychology Biology |
EISSN | 1879-0607 |
EndPage | 248 |
ExternalDocumentID | 10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2008_01_001 S1090513808000068 1_s2_0_S1090513808000068 |
GroupedDBID | --K --M -~X .1- .FO .~1 0R~ 1B1 1P~ 1RT 1~. 1~5 29G 4.4 457 4G. 53G 5GY 5VS 7-5 71M 8P~ AABNK AACTN AADFP AAEDT AAEDW AAFJI AAGJA AAGUQ AAIKJ AAKOC AALCJ AALRI AAOAW AAQFI AAQXK AATLK AAXKI AAXLA AAXUO ABCQJ ABFNM ABGRD ABIVO ABMAC ABOYX ABXDB ACDAQ ACGFS ACHQT ACIUM ACRLP ACXNI ADBBV ADEZE ADMUD ADQTV ADVLN AEBSH AEKER AENEX AEQOU AEVXI AFCTW AFJKZ AFKWA AFRHN AFTJW AFXIZ AGHFR AGUBO AGWIK AGYEJ AIEXJ AIKHN AITUG AJOXV AJUYK AKRWK ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS AMFUW AMRAJ AOMHK ASPBG AVARZ AVWKF AXJTR AZFZN BKOJK BLXMC CS3 DU5 EBS EFJIC EJD EO8 EO9 EP2 EP3 F5P FDB FEDTE FGOYB FIRID FNPLU FYGXN G-Q GBLVA HF~ HVGLF HZ~ IHE J1W KOM M41 MO0 MOBAO MVM N9A NHB O-L O9- OAUVE OH0 OKEIE OU- OZT P-8 P-9 P2P PC. PRBVW Q38 R2- RIG ROL RPZ SCC SDF SDG SDP SEL SES SEW SPCBC SSA SSB SSN SSY SSZ T5K TN5 UHS WH7 XJT XSW Z5R ZCA ~G- AABVA AADPK AAIAV ABYKQ AFYLN AJBFU CBWCG EFLBG AAYXX CITATION 8BJ FQK JBE 7U4 BHHNA DWI WZK |
ID | FETCH-LOGICAL-c441t-3314880b00106b3881cf8b0f54b85559cd1a5a75471ba6273098a5117af4c3b03 |
IEDL.DBID | .~1 |
ISSN | 1090-5138 |
IngestDate | Sat Oct 05 05:47:49 EDT 2024 Fri Oct 25 11:15:13 EDT 2024 Thu Sep 26 19:39:22 EDT 2024 Fri Feb 23 02:33:04 EST 2024 Tue Oct 15 22:55:50 EDT 2024 |
IsPeerReviewed | true |
IsScholarly | true |
Issue | 4 |
Keywords | Altruism Reputation Altruistic punishment Costly signaling Indirect reciprocity |
Language | English |
LinkModel | DirectLink |
MergedId | FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c441t-3314880b00106b3881cf8b0f54b85559cd1a5a75471ba6273098a5117af4c3b03 |
Notes | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
PQID | 36912621 |
PQPubID | 23473 |
PageCount | 7 |
ParticipantIDs | proquest_miscellaneous_61700541 proquest_miscellaneous_36912621 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2008_01_001 elsevier_sciencedirect_doi_10_1016_j_evolhumbehav_2008_01_001 elsevier_clinicalkeyesjournals_1_s2_0_S1090513808000068 |
PublicationCentury | 2000 |
PublicationDate | 2008-07-01 |
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD | 2008-07-01 |
PublicationDate_xml | – month: 07 year: 2008 text: 2008-07-01 day: 01 |
PublicationDecade | 2000 |
PublicationTitle | Evolution and human behavior |
PublicationYear | 2008 |
Publisher | Elsevier Inc |
Publisher_xml | – name: Elsevier Inc |
References | Zahavi, Zahavi (bib46) 1997 Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe (bib7) 1995; 10 Thorndike (bib40) 1920; IV Rockenbach, Milinski (bib35) 2006; 444 Boone (bib9) 1998; 9 Cosmides, Tooby (bib12) 1992 Cronk (bib13) 2005; 44 Barclay (bib4) 2004; 25 Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, Smith (bib26) 1994; 7 Titmuss (bib41) 1970 Trivers (bib42) 1971; 46 Fehr, Fischbacher (bib15) 2004; 25 Gurven (bib21) 2004; 27 Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck (bib30) 2002; 269 Sober, Wilson (bib39) 1998 Andrews, Gangestad, Matthews (bib2) 2002; 25 Barclay (bib5) 2006; 27 Henrich, Boyd (bib24) 2001; 208 Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, Richerson (bib10) 2003; 100 Camerer (bib11) 2003 Henrich, Henrich (bib25) 2006; 7 Smith, Borgerhoff Mulder, Hill (bib38) 2001; 16 Barron, Kenny (bib6) 1986; 51 Fehr, Gächter (bib16) 2002; 415 Williams (bib44) 1966 Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck (bib29) 2002; 415 Gintis, Smith, Bowles (bib19) 2001; 213 Gneezy, Rustichini (bib20) 2000; 29 Alexander (bib1) 1987 Axelrod (bib3) 1985 Kurzban, DeScioli, O'Brien (bib27) 2007; 28 Panchanathan, Boyd (bib33) 2004; 432 Smith, Bliege Bird, Bird (bib37) 2003; 14 Rege, Tele (bib34) 2004; 88 Bliege Bird, Smith (bib8) 2005; 46 Hamilton (bib22) 1964; 7 Veblen (bib43) 1994/1899 Hardy, Van Vugt (bib23) 2006; 32 McAndrew (bib28) 2002; 11 Zahavi (bib45) 1975; 53 Smith, Bliege Bird (bib36) 2000; 21 Fessler, Haley (bib17) 2003 Fehr, Fischbacher (bib14) 2003; 425 Frank (bib18) 1988 Nowak, Sigmund (bib32) 2005; 437 Nowak (bib31) 2006; 314 Zahavi (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib45) 1975; 53 Camerer (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib11) 2003 Gintis (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib19) 2001; 213 Gurven (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib21) 2004; 27 Axelrod (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib3) 1985 Panchanathan (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib33) 2004; 432 Zahavi (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib46) 1997 Fehr (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib16) 2002; 415 Kurzban (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib27) 2007; 28 Hoffman (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib26) 1994; 7 Smith (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib37) 2003; 14 Cronk (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib13) 2005; 44 Fehr (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib15) 2004; 25 Fessler (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib17) 2003 Henrich (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib24) 2001; 208 Titmuss (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib41) 1970 Alexander (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib1) 1987 Bliege Bird (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib8) 2005; 46 Cosmides (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib12) 1992 Berg (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib7) 1995; 10 Veblen (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib43) 1994 Hardy (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib23) 2006; 32 Fehr (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib14) 2003; 425 Trivers (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib42) 1971; 46 Rege (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib34) 2004; 88 Smith (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib36) 2000; 21 McAndrew (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib28) 2002; 11 Gneezy (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib20) 2000; 29 Milinski (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib29) 2002; 415 Barron (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib6) 1986; 51 Barclay (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib5) 2006; 27 Boyd (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib10) 2003; 100 Nowak (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib31) 2006; 314 Hamilton (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib22) 1964; 7 Henrich (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib25) 2006; 7 Sober (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib39) 1998 Nowak (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib32) 2005; 437 Andrews (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib2) 2002; 25 Williams (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib44) 1966 Smith (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib38) 2001; 16 Thorndike (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib40) 1920; IV Boone (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib9) 1998; 9 Barclay (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib4) 2004; 25 Rockenbach (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib35) 2006; 444 Frank (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib18) 1988 Milinski (10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib30) 2002; 269 |
References_xml | – volume: 27 start-page: 543 year: 2004 end-page: 583 ident: bib21 article-title: To give and to give not: The behavioral ecology of human food transfers publication-title: Behavioral and Brain Sciences contributor: fullname: Gurven – year: 1985 ident: bib3 article-title: The evolution of cooperation contributor: fullname: Axelrod – year: 1987 ident: bib1 article-title: The biology of moral systems contributor: fullname: Alexander – volume: 425 start-page: 785 year: 2003 end-page: 791 ident: bib14 article-title: The nature of human altruism publication-title: Nature contributor: fullname: Fischbacher – volume: 415 start-page: 424 year: 2002 end-page: 426 ident: bib29 article-title: Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’ publication-title: Nature contributor: fullname: Krambeck – year: 1998 ident: bib39 article-title: Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior contributor: fullname: Wilson – volume: 432 start-page: 499 year: 2004 end-page: 502 ident: bib33 article-title: Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem publication-title: Nature contributor: fullname: Boyd – volume: 10 start-page: 122 year: 1995 end-page: 142 ident: bib7 article-title: Trust, reciprocity, and social history publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior contributor: fullname: McCabe – volume: 208 start-page: 79 year: 2001 end-page: 89 ident: bib24 article-title: Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas publication-title: Journal of Theoretical Biology contributor: fullname: Boyd – volume: 444 start-page: 718 year: 2006 end-page: 723 ident: bib35 article-title: The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment publication-title: Nature contributor: fullname: Milinski – volume: 7 start-page: 220 year: 2006 end-page: 245 ident: bib25 article-title: Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation publication-title: Cognitive Systems Research contributor: fullname: Henrich – year: 2003 ident: bib11 article-title: Behavioral game theory contributor: fullname: Camerer – volume: 32 start-page: 1402 year: 2006 end-page: 1413 ident: bib23 article-title: Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis publication-title: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin contributor: fullname: Van Vugt – volume: 7 start-page: 346 year: 1994 end-page: 380 ident: bib26 article-title: Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior contributor: fullname: Smith – year: 1994/1899 ident: bib43 article-title: contributor: fullname: Veblen – volume: 28 start-page: 75 year: 2007 end-page: 84 ident: bib27 article-title: Audience effects on moralistic punishment publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior contributor: fullname: O'Brien – volume: 16 start-page: 128 year: 2001 end-page: 135 ident: bib38 article-title: Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: A guide for the perplexed publication-title: Trends in Ecology & Evolution contributor: fullname: Hill – year: 1966 ident: bib44 article-title: contributor: fullname: Williams – volume: 25 start-page: 63 year: 2004 end-page: 87 ident: bib15 article-title: Third-party punishment and social norms publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior contributor: fullname: Fischbacher – volume: 269 start-page: 881 year: 2002 end-page: 883 ident: bib30 article-title: Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation publication-title: Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B contributor: fullname: Krambeck – volume: 51 start-page: 1173 year: 1986 end-page: 1182 ident: bib6 article-title: The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations publication-title: Journal of Personality and social Psychology contributor: fullname: Kenny – year: 1970 ident: bib41 article-title: The give relationship contributor: fullname: Titmuss – start-page: 7 year: 2003 end-page: 36 ident: bib17 article-title: The strategy of affect: Emotions in human cooperation publication-title: Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation contributor: fullname: Haley – volume: 213 start-page: 103 year: 2001 end-page: 119 ident: bib19 article-title: Costly signaling and cooperation publication-title: Journal of Theoretical Biology contributor: fullname: Bowles – volume: 415 start-page: 137 year: 2002 end-page: 140 ident: bib16 article-title: Altruistic punishment in humans publication-title: Nature contributor: fullname: Gächter – volume: 25 start-page: 209 year: 2004 end-page: 220 ident: bib4 article-title: Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of the commons” publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior contributor: fullname: Barclay – year: 1997 ident: bib46 article-title: The handicap principle: A missing piece of Darwin's puzzle contributor: fullname: Zahavi – volume: 25 start-page: 489 year: 2002 end-page: 504 ident: bib2 article-title: Adaptationism—how to carry out an exaptationist program publication-title: Behavioral and Brain Sciences contributor: fullname: Matthews – volume: 9 start-page: 1 year: 1998 end-page: 21 ident: bib9 article-title: The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive? publication-title: Human Nature contributor: fullname: Boone – year: 1988 ident: bib18 article-title: Passions with reason: The strategic role of emotions contributor: fullname: Frank – volume: 44 start-page: 603 year: 2005 end-page: 620 ident: bib13 article-title: The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: Some thoughts and clarifications publication-title: Social Science Information contributor: fullname: Cronk – volume: 314 start-page: 1560 year: 2006 end-page: 1563 ident: bib31 article-title: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation publication-title: Science contributor: fullname: Nowak – volume: 21 start-page: 245 year: 2000 end-page: 261 ident: bib36 article-title: Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: Public generosity as costly signaling publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior contributor: fullname: Bliege Bird – volume: 88 start-page: 1625 year: 2004 end-page: 1644 ident: bib34 article-title: The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations publication-title: Journal of Public Economics contributor: fullname: Tele – volume: 27 start-page: 325 year: 2006 end-page: 344 ident: bib5 article-title: Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior contributor: fullname: Barclay – volume: 437 start-page: 1291 year: 2005 end-page: 1298 ident: bib32 article-title: Evolution and indirect reciprocity publication-title: Nature contributor: fullname: Sigmund – volume: 46 start-page: 35 year: 1971 end-page: 57 ident: bib42 article-title: The evolution of reciprocal altruism publication-title: Quarterly Review of Biology contributor: fullname: Trivers – year: 1992 ident: bib12 article-title: Cognitive adaptations for social exchange publication-title: The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture contributor: fullname: Tooby – volume: 14 start-page: 116 year: 2003 end-page: 126 ident: bib37 article-title: The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters publication-title: Behavioral Ecology contributor: fullname: Bird – volume: 100 start-page: 3531 year: 2003 end-page: 3535 ident: bib10 article-title: The evolution of altruistic punishment publication-title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America contributor: fullname: Richerson – volume: 11 start-page: 79 year: 2002 end-page: 82 ident: bib28 article-title: New evolutionary perspectives on altruism: Multilevel-selection and costly-signaling theories publication-title: Current Directions in Psychological Science contributor: fullname: McAndrew – volume: 46 start-page: 221 year: 2005 end-page: 248 ident: bib8 article-title: Signaling theory, strategic interaction, and symbolic capital publication-title: Current Anthropology contributor: fullname: Smith – volume: 29 start-page: 1 year: 2000 end-page: 17 ident: bib20 article-title: A fine is a price publication-title: Journal of Legal Studies contributor: fullname: Rustichini – volume: 7 start-page: 1 year: 1964 end-page: 32 ident: bib22 article-title: The genetical theory of social behavior: I and II publication-title: Journal of Theoretical Biology contributor: fullname: Hamilton – volume: IV start-page: 25 year: 1920 end-page: 29 ident: bib40 article-title: A constant error on psychological rating publication-title: Journal of Applied Psychology contributor: fullname: Thorndike – volume: 53 start-page: 205 year: 1975 end-page: 214 ident: bib45 article-title: Mate selection—a selection for a handicap publication-title: Journal of theoretical Biology contributor: fullname: Zahavi – volume: 100 start-page: 3531 year: 2003 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib10 article-title: The evolution of altruistic punishment publication-title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America doi: 10.1073/pnas.0630443100 contributor: fullname: Boyd – year: 1998 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib39 contributor: fullname: Sober – year: 1988 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib18 contributor: fullname: Frank – volume: 415 start-page: 424 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib29 article-title: Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’ publication-title: Nature doi: 10.1038/415424a contributor: fullname: Milinski – volume: 314 start-page: 1560 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib31 article-title: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation publication-title: Science doi: 10.1126/science.1133755 contributor: fullname: Nowak – volume: 51 start-page: 1173 year: 1986 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib6 article-title: The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations publication-title: Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173 contributor: fullname: Barron – volume: 28 start-page: 75 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib27 article-title: Audience effects on moralistic punishment publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001 contributor: fullname: Kurzban – volume: 25 start-page: 63 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib15 article-title: Third-party punishment and social norms publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 contributor: fullname: Fehr – volume: 16 start-page: 128 year: 2001 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib38 article-title: Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: A guide for the perplexed publication-title: Trends in Ecology & Evolution doi: 10.1016/S0169-5347(00)02077-2 contributor: fullname: Smith – volume: 88 start-page: 1625 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib34 article-title: The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations publication-title: Journal of Public Economics doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5 contributor: fullname: Rege – year: 1994 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib43 contributor: fullname: Veblen – volume: 7 start-page: 1 year: 1964 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib22 article-title: The genetical theory of social behavior: I and II publication-title: Journal of Theoretical Biology doi: 10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 contributor: fullname: Hamilton – year: 2003 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib11 contributor: fullname: Camerer – volume: 29 start-page: 1 year: 2000 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib20 article-title: A fine is a price publication-title: Journal of Legal Studies doi: 10.1086/468061 contributor: fullname: Gneezy – volume: 208 start-page: 79 year: 2001 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib24 article-title: Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas publication-title: Journal of Theoretical Biology doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 contributor: fullname: Henrich – volume: 444 start-page: 718 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib35 article-title: The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment publication-title: Nature doi: 10.1038/nature05229 contributor: fullname: Rockenbach – volume: 437 start-page: 1291 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib32 article-title: Evolution and indirect reciprocity publication-title: Nature doi: 10.1038/nature04131 contributor: fullname: Nowak – year: 1966 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib44 contributor: fullname: Williams – volume: 425 start-page: 785 year: 2003 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib14 article-title: The nature of human altruism publication-title: Nature doi: 10.1038/nature02043 contributor: fullname: Fehr – volume: 25 start-page: 489 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib2 article-title: Adaptationism—how to carry out an exaptationist program publication-title: Behavioral and Brain Sciences doi: 10.1017/S0140525X02000092 contributor: fullname: Andrews – year: 1970 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib41 contributor: fullname: Titmuss – year: 1985 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib3 contributor: fullname: Axelrod – volume: 7 start-page: 220 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib25 article-title: Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation publication-title: Cognitive Systems Research doi: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.010 contributor: fullname: Henrich – volume: 21 start-page: 245 year: 2000 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib36 article-title: Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: Public generosity as costly signaling publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3 contributor: fullname: Smith – volume: 9 start-page: 1 year: 1998 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib9 article-title: The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive? publication-title: Human Nature doi: 10.1007/s12110-998-1009-y contributor: fullname: Boone – volume: 32 start-page: 1402 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib23 article-title: Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis publication-title: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin doi: 10.1177/0146167206291006 contributor: fullname: Hardy – volume: 11 start-page: 79 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib28 article-title: New evolutionary perspectives on altruism: Multilevel-selection and costly-signaling theories publication-title: Current Directions in Psychological Science doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.00173 contributor: fullname: McAndrew – volume: 432 start-page: 499 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib33 article-title: Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem publication-title: Nature doi: 10.1038/nature02978 contributor: fullname: Panchanathan – volume: 25 start-page: 209 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib4 article-title: Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of the commons” publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.04.002 contributor: fullname: Barclay – volume: 27 start-page: 543 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib21 article-title: To give and to give not: The behavioral ecology of human food transfers publication-title: Behavioral and Brain Sciences doi: 10.1017/S0140525X04000123 contributor: fullname: Gurven – volume: 27 start-page: 325 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib5 article-title: Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment publication-title: Evolution and Human Behavior doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.01.003 contributor: fullname: Barclay – year: 1992 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib12 article-title: Cognitive adaptations for social exchange contributor: fullname: Cosmides – start-page: 7 year: 2003 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib17 article-title: The strategy of affect: Emotions in human cooperation contributor: fullname: Fessler – volume: IV start-page: 25 year: 1920 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib40 article-title: A constant error on psychological rating publication-title: Journal of Applied Psychology doi: 10.1037/h0071663 contributor: fullname: Thorndike – volume: 46 start-page: 221 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib8 article-title: Signaling theory, strategic interaction, and symbolic capital publication-title: Current Anthropology doi: 10.1086/427115 contributor: fullname: Bliege Bird – volume: 415 start-page: 137 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib16 article-title: Altruistic punishment in humans publication-title: Nature doi: 10.1038/415137a contributor: fullname: Fehr – volume: 53 start-page: 205 year: 1975 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib45 article-title: Mate selection—a selection for a handicap publication-title: Journal of theoretical Biology doi: 10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 contributor: fullname: Zahavi – volume: 7 start-page: 346 year: 1994 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib26 article-title: Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior doi: 10.1006/game.1994.1056 contributor: fullname: Hoffman – year: 1997 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib46 contributor: fullname: Zahavi – volume: 269 start-page: 881 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib30 article-title: Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation publication-title: Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964 contributor: fullname: Milinski – volume: 10 start-page: 122 year: 1995 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib7 article-title: Trust, reciprocity, and social history publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027 contributor: fullname: Berg – volume: 46 start-page: 35 year: 1971 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib42 article-title: The evolution of reciprocal altruism publication-title: Quarterly Review of Biology doi: 10.1086/406755 contributor: fullname: Trivers – volume: 44 start-page: 603 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib13 article-title: The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: Some thoughts and clarifications publication-title: Social Science Information doi: 10.1177/0539018405058203 contributor: fullname: Cronk – volume: 213 start-page: 103 year: 2001 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib19 article-title: Costly signaling and cooperation publication-title: Journal of Theoretical Biology doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 contributor: fullname: Gintis – volume: 14 start-page: 116 year: 2003 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib37 article-title: The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters publication-title: Behavioral Ecology doi: 10.1093/beheco/14.1.116 contributor: fullname: Smith – year: 1987 ident: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001_bib1 contributor: fullname: Alexander |
SSID | ssj0004459 |
Score | 2.2461984 |
Snippet | Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater... Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing... |
SourceID | proquest crossref elsevier |
SourceType | Aggregation Database Publisher |
StartPage | 242 |
SubjectTerms | Altruism Altruistic punishment Behavioural psychology Costly signaling Costs Indirect reciprocity Psychiatry Punishment Reciprocity Reputation Trust |
Title | The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment |
URI | https://www.clinicalkey.es/playcontent/1-s2.0-S1090513808000068 https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001 https://search.proquest.com/docview/36912621 https://search.proquest.com/docview/61700541 |
Volume | 29 |
hasFullText | 1 |
inHoldings | 1 |
isFullTextHit | |
isPrint | |
link | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwpV3fS9xAEB5EEXwRtRWv6nUf-ppeNtkkuwUf5FCuFX1RQXxZdnMbTimXYHKFe-nf3plk448WRehbEjZkmZ39ZjbzzQzAlyhS0hGr0VmbBSJFNVbK5MHUyMRwVSR5mwtzfpFOrsWPm-RmBcZ9LgzRKj32d5jeorV_MvLSHFV3d6NLohQmPKbCiAS6lPBLxbZQp7_-fqJ5CNE2TKPBAY3uC4-2HC-HEDCjzhsz88vzKjnFJl4zUn_BdWuDTrdg0zuP7Lib3zasuPkOrHftJJc7sPGIZnizflu2Vx_gHFWBVVQ8iC3LBavM8hvLy7oJ-ga4DXtw1aKLyTNP8GBlwczP5mHRFnJmFUW9Z_Qn8SNcn55cjSeB76IQ5OjqNEEcc9qk3enPxlLyvJA2LBJhZYLniXzKTWKyBK2UNSl6M6GSBuWYmULksQ3jXVidl3O3BywSNlSmmKoslGJqUAnRmgmVOjwFcSPlAOJebLrqimXonkV2r58L23e_5ESpG0DWS1j36aAIYK72u6nWXNeRDvU_Kz6Ao8c3XyiNRnvwri9_7hdU466iUImZu3JR6zhVPEqjN0ZQIXt0d_mn_5zDPmx0FBRiAB_AKi6sO0Q_p7HDVpGHsHb8_Wxy8Qd_T_3A |
link.rule.ids | 315,783,787,4511,24130,27938,27939,45599,45693 |
linkProvider | Elsevier |
linkToHtml | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwpV1LT9wwEB7xEIJLRWkrtuXhQ6_RxnnaSBzQCrQUdi8FCfVi2VlHC0KbiGSR9t93JnGWR0WFxC2JbCUaj78ZZ76ZAfgZBFJYYjVaY1IvSlCNpdSZN9Ei1lzmcdbkwozGyfA6-nUT36zAoMuFIVqlw_4W0xu0dk_6Tpr98va2_5sohTEPqTAiga5YhXX0BiQq-_rJ-cVw_JQeGTU902i8RxO62qMNzcsiCkyp-cZUPzpqJafwxFt26hViN2bobBs-Of-RnbSf-BlW7GwHNtqOkosd2FoCGt5s_Cmaqy8wQm1gJdUPYotizkq9OGJZUdVe1wO3Zg-2nLdheeY4HqzImb6vH-ZNLWdWUuB7Sj8Tv8L12enVYOi5Rgpeht5O7YUhp33aHgBNKATPcmH8PI6MiPFIkU24jnUao6EyOkGHxpdCoyeW6jzKQuOH32BtVszsLrAgMr7U-USmvogmGvUQDVokE4sHIa6F6EHYiU2Vbb0M1RHJ7tRzYbsGmJxYdT1IOwmrLiMUMcxWbkNViqsqUL76Z9F7cLyc-UJvFJqEd735sFtQhRuLoiV6Zot5pcJE8iAJ_jOCatmjx8u_f_AbDmFzeDW6VJfn44sfsNUyUogQvAdruMh2H92e2hw4tf4LTR0AjA |
openUrl | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The+price+you+pay%3A+cost-dependent+reputation+effects+of+altruistic+punishment&rft.jtitle=Evolution+and+human+behavior&rft.au=Nelissen%2C+Rob+M.A&rft.date=2008-07-01&rft.issn=1090-5138&rft.volume=29&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=242&rft.epage=248&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016%2Fj.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001&rft.externalDBID=ECK1-s2.0-S1090513808000068&rft.externalDocID=1_s2_0_S1090513808000068 |
thumbnail_m | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.clinicalkey.com%2Fck-thumbnails%2F10905138%2FS1090513808X00042%2Fcov150h.gif |