The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment

Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfa...

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Published inEvolution and human behavior Vol. 29; no. 4; pp. 242 - 248
Main Author Nelissen, Rob M.A
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Inc 01.07.2008
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Abstract Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework.
AbstractList Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework.
Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. All rights reserved, Elsevier
Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework.
Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing benefits. We tested this prediction by varying the cost invested in altruistic behavior, here modeled as costly sanctioning of unfair behavior. Confirming this prediction, it was found that only altruists who invested most in the punishment of unfairness were preferred as partners and were transferred more money in a subsequent trust game. This implies that the benefits of behaving altruistically depend upon how much one is willing to pay. It is discussed that these results fit both an indirect reciprocity and a costly signaling framework. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Inc.]
Author Nelissen, Rob M.A
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Keywords Altruism
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Altruistic punishment
Costly signaling
Indirect reciprocity
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Snippet Abstract Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater...
Two studies were conducted to test reputation-based accounts of altruism which predict that the more people sacrifice to help others, the greater their ensuing...
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SubjectTerms Altruism
Altruistic punishment
Behavioural psychology
Costly signaling
Costs
Indirect reciprocity
Psychiatry
Punishment
Reciprocity
Reputation
Trust
Title The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment
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https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001
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https://search.proquest.com/docview/61700541
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