Realism in political theory

• Published in: European journal of political theory Vol. 9; no. 4; pp. 385 - 411
• Main Author: Galston, William A
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London, England SAGE Publications 01.10.2010; Sage Publications Ltd
• Subjects: Conflict; Countermovements; Criticism; Emotions; Ethics; Idealism; Institutions; Moral philosophy; Morality; National interest; Philosophers; Political norms; Political scientists; Political theory; Politics; Psychology; Realism; Values; institutions; moral psychology; ideal theory; realism; moralism; conflict
• DOI: 10.1177/1474885110374001
• ISSN: 1474-8851

In recent decades, a ‘realist’ alternative to ideal theories of politics has slowly taken shape. Bringing together philosophers, political theorists, and political scientists, this countermovement seeks to reframe inquiry into politics and political norms. Among the hallmarks of this endeavor are a moral psychology that includes the passions and emotions; a robust conception of political possibility and rejection of utopian thinking; the belief that political conflict — of values as well as interests — is both fundamental and ineradicable; a focus on institutions as the arenas within which conflict is mediated and contained; and a conception of politics as a sphere of activity that is distinct, autonomous, and subject to norms that cannot be derived from individual morality. For political realists, a ‘well-ordered society’ is rarely attainable; a modus vivendi without agreement on first principles is often the only practical possibility. Not only will ‘full compliance’ never be achieved, but also it is an assumption that yields misleading accounts of political norms. While realists offer a number of compelling criticisms of ideal theory, there are some lacunae in their stance. It is not yet clear whether realism constitutes a coherent affirmative alternative to idealism. Nor have realists clarified the extent of conflict that is consistent with political order as such. And because both sides accept ‘ought implies can’ as a constraint on the validity of political norms, much of the debate between realists and idealists revolves around deep empirical disagreements that are yet to be clarified.