A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games

Under regularity and boundary conditions which ensure an interior maximum, I show that there is a unique critical point which is a global maximum if and only if the Hessian determinant of the negated objective function is strictly positive at any critical point. Within the large class of Morse funct...

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Published inEconomics letters Vol. 161; pp. 120 - 123
Main Author Christensen, Finn
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.12.2017
Elsevier Science Ltd
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Abstract Under regularity and boundary conditions which ensure an interior maximum, I show that there is a unique critical point which is a global maximum if and only if the Hessian determinant of the negated objective function is strictly positive at any critical point. Within the large class of Morse functions, and subject to boundary conditions, this local and ordinal condition generalizes strict concavity, and is satisfied by nearly all strictly quasiconcave functions. The result also provides a new uniqueness theorem for potential games. •In some contexts, “∇f(x∗)=0⇒det(−D2f(x∗))>0” iff there is a unique critical point that is a global maximum.•This is an alternative to strict quasiconcavity which is only a sufficient condition.•The result is applied to potential games and yields a new uniqueness theorem.•The proof is an application of the Poincaré–Hopf Theorem from differential topology
AbstractList Under regularity and boundary conditions which ensure an interior maximum, I show that there is a unique critical point which is a global maximum if and only if the Hessian determinant of the negated objective function is strictly positive at any critical point. Within the large class of Morse functions, and subject to boundary conditions, this local and ordinal condition generalizes strict concavity, and is satisfied by nearly all strictly quasiconcave functions. The result also provides a new uniqueness theorem for potential games.
Under regularity and boundary conditions which ensure an interior maximum, I show that there is a unique critical point which is a global maximum if and only if the Hessian determinant of the negated objective function is strictly positive at any critical point. Within the large class of Morse functions, and subject to boundary conditions, this local and ordinal condition generalizes strict concavity, and is satisfied by nearly all strictly quasiconcave functions. The result also provides a new uniqueness theorem for potential games. •In some contexts, “∇f(x∗)=0⇒det(−D2f(x∗))>0” iff there is a unique critical point that is a global maximum.•This is an alternative to strict quasiconcavity which is only a sufficient condition.•The result is applied to potential games and yields a new uniqueness theorem.•The proof is an application of the Poincaré–Hopf Theorem from differential topology
Author Christensen, Finn
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10.2307/2297489
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10.2307/1912091
10.2307/1885738
10.1006/game.1996.0044
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Snippet Under regularity and boundary conditions which ensure an interior maximum, I show that there is a unique critical point which is a global maximum if and only...
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SubjectTerms Boundary conditions
economics
Game theory
Games
Index theory
Optimization
Potential games
Regularity
Studies
Uniqueness
Title A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games
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