Talking to the hand: Bargaining, strategic interaction, and economic sanctions
The dominant theoretical perspective guiding research on economic sanctions views sanctions as tools of bargaining. This implies that senders and targets are engaged in strategic interaction and that each is basing its decisions, in part, on its expectations regarding how its opponent will react. In...
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| Published in | European economic review Vol. 134; p. 103685 |
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| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
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Elsevier B.V
01.05.2021
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| Abstract | The dominant theoretical perspective guiding research on economic sanctions views sanctions as tools of bargaining. This implies that senders and targets are engaged in strategic interaction and that each is basing its decisions, in part, on its expectations regarding how its opponent will react. In this paper, we test a number of hypotheses derived from a game-theoretic model developed by Morgan and Miers (1999) that focus specifically on the bargaining processes in sanctions episodes. Our results provide no support for these hypotheses and seem to suggest that sanctions senders and targets are paying very little attention to each other, at least in a manner consistent with the theory. We conclude with a consideration of why this might be the case and with some speculation regarding what this means for future research into the processes of economic sanctions. In short, we believe our results indicate that a new theoretical paradigm, focusing on legal enforcement and economic adjustment at the micro level is in order. |
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| AbstractList | The dominant theoretical perspective guiding research on economic sanctions views sanctions as tools of bargaining. This implies that senders and targets are engaged in strategic interaction and that each is basing its decisions, in part, on its expectations regarding how its opponent will react. In this paper, we test a number of hypotheses derived from a game-theoretic model developed by Morgan and Miers (1999) that focus specifically on the bargaining processes in sanctions episodes. Our results provide no support for these hypotheses and seem to suggest that sanctions senders and targets are paying very little attention to each other, at least in a manner consistent with the theory. We conclude with a consideration of why this might be the case and with some speculation regarding what this means for future research into the processes of economic sanctions. In short, we believe our results indicate that a new theoretical paradigm, focusing on legal enforcement and economic adjustment at the micro level is in order. |
| ArticleNumber | 103685 |
| Author | Kobayashi, Yoshiharu Morgan, T. Clifton |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: T. Clifton surname: Morgan fullname: Morgan, T. Clifton email: morgan@rice.edu – sequence: 2 givenname: Yoshiharu surname: Kobayashi fullname: Kobayashi, Yoshiharu email: Y.Kobayashi@leeds.ac.uk |
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| Cites_doi | 10.1080/03050629.2013.863194 10.1177/0022343398035004006 10.1017/S0020818300033324 10.1086/261845 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00629.x 10.1177/00223433030405002 10.1162/isec.22.2.90 10.1093/jogss/ogy006 10.1080/03050620210394 10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x 10.1017/S0020818314000216 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00581.x 10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800137 10.1177/0738894211413057 10.1017/S0020818303573052 10.1080/03050629508434867 10.1177/0022002708325044 10.1177/0022343310376868 10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02027-8 10.1093/pan/mpq013 10.1111/isqu.12017 10.1177/0022002702046005006 10.1080/03050629.2013.751298 10.1177/0738894216635023 10.1111/0020-8833.00113 10.1177/0738894213520379 10.2307/2938740 10.1177/106591290005300203 10.1177/00223433030406002 10.1080/03050620108434972 10.2307/2009785 10.1177/0022343310381854 10.1177/0022002707306811 10.1177/106591290005300202 10.1353/wp.2006.0011 |
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| Keywords | Sanctions threats Bargaining Economic sanctions |
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