Awareness of Abstract Objects
Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, feeling, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items, such as universals, propositions, numbers, functions, and sets, which contrast with concrete objects, such as solids, liquids, gases, particles, and organisms. It...
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Published in | Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 706 - 726 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Malden, MA
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.12.2013
Wiley Blackwell Wiley-Blackwell |
Subjects | |
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Abstract | Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, feeling, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items, such as universals, propositions, numbers, functions, and sets, which contrast with concrete objects, such as solids, liquids, gases, particles, and organisms. It is a nice question what defines the category of abstract objects. This paper defends the view that some intuitions--more specifically, some mathematical intuitions--make their subjects aware of abstract objects. |
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AbstractList | Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, feeling, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items, such as universals, propositions, numbers, functions, and sets, which contrast with concrete objects, such as solids, liquids, gases, particles, and organisms. It is a nice question what defines the category of abstract objects. This paper defends the view that some intuitions--more specifically, some mathematical intuitions--make their subjects aware of abstract objects. |
Author | Chudnoff, Elijah |
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Cites_doi | 10.1007/s11098-006-9050-3 10.2307/2107488 10.1111/1468-0378.00151 10.2307/2025075 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001 10.1017/CBO9780511498534 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00463.x 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033753.64202.21 10.1111/1468-0068.00402 10.5840/jphil2006103125 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007 10.1023/A:1005223128130 10.2307/2214644 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00578.x 10.1007/978-94-009-2293-8 10.1017/CBO9780511498589 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.001.0001 10.1093/oso/9780195323252.001.0001 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001 10.2307/1522889 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x 10.1007/s11098-009-9388-4 10.1093/oso/9780195147216.001.0001 10.1093/aristotelian/80.1.145 10.1093/0199243816.001.0001 10.1007/s11097-012-9279-6 10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x 10.1080/00048400600895961 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01285.x 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00130.x 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00421.x 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001 10.1023/A:1004515508042 10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y |
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Notes | ArticleID:NOUS851 istex:CE608D828AE1374E9179AA27BFEA356EAF9C9F54 I thank Uriah Kriegel, Richard Tieszen, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. ark:/67375/WNG-FJXCB4CC-0 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 |
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References_xml | – reference: Gurwitsch, Aron. 1964. Field of Consciousness. Duquesne University Press. – reference: Dancy, Jonathan. 1988. Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press. – reference: Ludwig, Kirk. 2007. The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches. Midwest Studies in Philosophy: 128-159. – reference: Chudnoff, Elijah. 2011b. What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(3): 625-654. – reference: Block, Ned. 1996. Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 7: 19-49. – reference: Ichikawa, Jonathan, and Benjamin Jarvis. 2009. Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction. Philosophical Studies 142, no. 2 (January 1): 221-246. – reference: Johnston, M. 2004. The Obscure Object of Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120, no. 1: 113-183. – reference: Paul, Laurie. 2002. Logical Parts. Nous, 36(4): 578-596. – reference: Husserl, Edmund. 2001. Logical Investigations, Vol. 2. Routledge. – reference: Rosen, Gideon. 2001. Abstract Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. – reference: Tieszen, Richard. 2005a. Consciousness of Abstract Objects. Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind: 181-200. – reference: Sosa, Ernest. 2007. Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 132, no. 1: 99-107. – reference: Hale, Bob and Aviv Hoffman. 2010. Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. – reference: Schellenberg, S. 2011. Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83(1): 1-40. – reference: Dretske, Fred I.. 1999. The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical studies 95, no. 1: 103-124. – reference: Tye, M.. 2010. Consciousness Revisited. The MIT Press. – reference: Russell, Bertrand. 1997. The Problems of Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, USA. – reference: Rosen, Gideon. 2010. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. – reference: Earlenbaugh, J., and B. Molyneux. 2009. Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe. Philosophical studies 145, no. 1: 89-109. – reference: Huemer, Michael. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory.) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. – reference: Boghossian, Paul. 2001. Inference and Insight. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, no. 3: 633-640 – reference: Byrne, A., and H. Logue. 2009. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. The MIT Press. – reference: McGinn, C. 1982. The Character of Mind. Oxford University Press. – reference: William, James. 1983. The Principles of Psychology. Harvard University Press. – reference: Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols. 2008. Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press, USA. – reference: Chudnoff, Elijah. 2011c. What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65(4): 561-579. – reference: Johnston, M.. 2006. Hylomorphism. Journal of Philosophy 103, no. 12: 652-698. – reference: Hale, Bob, and Crispin Wright. 2002. Benacerraf's dilemma revisited. European Journal of Philosophy, 10, no. 1: 101-129 – reference: Smith, D. W, and A. L Thomasson. 2005. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press, USA. – reference: Tieszen, Richard. 2005b. Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press. – reference: Gödel, Kurt. 1947. What Is Cantor's Continuum Problem? In Collected Works: Volume II. Oxford UP. – reference: Feferman, S. 2000. Mathematical Intuition Vs. Mathematical Monsters. Synthese 125, no. 3: 317-332. – reference: Koffka, Kurt. 1935. Principles of Gestalt Psychology. Harcourt, Brace and Co. – reference: Williamson, Timothy. 2008. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. – reference: Parsons, C.. 2007. Mathematical Thought and Its Objects. Cambridge University Press. – reference: Kim, J. 1974. Noncausal Connections. Nous 8, no. 1: 41-52. – reference: Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19: 661-679. – reference: Siegel, S. 2006. How Does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-Seeing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 3: 429-441. – reference: Tieszen, Richard. 1989. Mathematical intuition. Springer. – reference: Russell, Bertrand. 1992. Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. Routledge. – reference: Tye, M. 1982. A Causal Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42, no. 3: 311-325. – reference: Tye, M.. 2002. Consciousness, Color, and Content. The MIT Press. – reference: Field, Hartry. 1989. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality. Blackwell Pub. – reference: Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press. – reference: Campbell, John. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. – reference: Chudnoff, Elijah. 2011a. The Nature of Intuitive Justification. 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