Individual and strategic behaviors in a dynamic extraction problem: results from a within-subject experiment in continuous time
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test a continuous-time model that represents a dynamic groundwater extraction problem in an infinite horizon. We compare the observations to the equilibrium path of the usual behaviours, for the case where the player is alone in extracting the resource (optimal...
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Published in | Applied economics Vol. 55; no. 39; pp. 4539 - 4562 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
London
Routledge
21.08.2023
Taylor & Francis Ltd Taylor & Francis (Routledge) |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0003-6846 1466-4283 |
DOI | 10.1080/00036846.2022.2129576 |
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