Individual and strategic behaviors in a dynamic extraction problem: results from a within-subject experiment in continuous time

We conduct a laboratory experiment to test a continuous-time model that represents a dynamic groundwater extraction problem in an infinite horizon. We compare the observations to the equilibrium path of the usual behaviours, for the case where the player is alone in extracting the resource (optimal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inApplied economics Vol. 55; no. 39; pp. 4539 - 4562
Main Authors Djiguemde, M., Dubois, D., Sauquet, A., Tidball, M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 21.08.2023
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0003-6846
1466-4283
DOI10.1080/00036846.2022.2129576

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