Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation

What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evid...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 767 - 794
Main Author Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.12.2013
Wiley Blackwell
Wiley-Blackwell
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Philosophy
Knowledge theory
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