Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory
Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this la...
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| Published in | Games and economic behavior Vol. 75; no. 1; pp. 17 - 34 |
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| Main Authors | , , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
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Duluth
Elsevier Inc
01.05.2012
Academic Press |
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| Abstract | Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter–subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case, these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter–subject anonymity. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. We find that the introduction of experimenter–subject anonymity has no significant effect in any of the three games. |
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| AbstractList | Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case, these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. We find that the introduction of experimenter-subject anonymity has no significant effect in any of the three games. All rights reserved, Elsevier Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter–subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case, these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter–subject anonymity. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. We find that the introduction of experimenter–subject anonymity has no significant effect in any of the three games. Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case, these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. We find that the introduction of experimenter-subject anonymity has no significant effect in any of the three games. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| Author | Fehr, Ernst Barmettler, Franziska Zehnder, Christian |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Franziska surname: Barmettler fullname: Barmettler, Franziska email: franziska.barmettler@ffgs.org organization: Foundation for Global Sustainability (FFGS), Minervastrasse 99, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland – sequence: 2 givenname: Ernst surname: Fehr fullname: Fehr, Ernst email: ernst.fehr@econ.uzh.ch organization: University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Bluemlisalpstr. 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland – sequence: 3 givenname: Christian surname: Zehnder fullname: Zehnder, Christian email: christian.zehnder@unil.ch organization: University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business and Economics, Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Internef 612, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland |
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| Keywords | Anonymity C91 Scrutiny Laboratory experiments D03 Prosocial behavior |
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