Changing your mind

When individuals detect an inconsistency in a set of propositions, they tend to change their minds about at least one proposition to resolve the inconsistency. The orthodox view from William James (1907) onward has been that a rational change should be minimal . We propose an alternative hypothesis...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMemory & cognition Vol. 37; no. 5; pp. 624 - 631
Main Authors Walsh, Clare R., Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer-Verlag 01.07.2009
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
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Summary:When individuals detect an inconsistency in a set of propositions, they tend to change their minds about at least one proposition to resolve the inconsistency. The orthodox view from William James (1907) onward has been that a rational change should be minimal . We propose an alternative hypothesis according to which individuals seek to resolve inconsistencies by explaining their origins. We report four experiments corroborating the explanatory hypothesis. Experiment 1 showed that participants’ explanations revised general conditional claims rather than specific categorical propositions. Experiment 2 showed that, when explanations did revise the categorical proposition, participants also tended to deny the consequences of a second generalization. Experiment 3 showed that this tendency persists when participants previously affirmed these consequences explicitly. Experiment 4 showed that, when participants could easily explain an inconsistency by revising a generalization, they were more likely to accept the consequences of a second generalization. All four results contravene minimalism but support the explanatory hypothesis.
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ISSN:0090-502X
1532-5946
DOI:10.3758/MC.37.5.624