What Do We Aim At When We Believe?

• Published in: Dialectica Vol. 65; no. 3; pp. 369 - 392
• Main Author: MCHUGH, Conor
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2011; Blackwell
• Subjects: Akrasia; Belief; Empirical evidence; Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Justified beliefs; Lotteries; Moral judgment; Normativity; Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language; Philosophy; Reasoning; Teleology; Truth; Belief; Epistemology;Philosophy of Science; Aim; Knowledge; Teleology

It is often said that belief aims at truth. I argue that if belief has an aim then that aim is knowledge rather than merely truth. My main argument appeals to the impossibility of forming a belief on the basis of evidence that only weakly favours a proposition. This phenomenon, I argue, is a problem...