A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations

• Published in: Economics letters Vol. 121; no. 2; pp. 321 - 325
• Main Authors: Nath, Swaprava, Zoeter, Onno
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.11.2013; Elsevier Science Ltd
• Subjects: Efficient mechanisms; Ex-post incentive compatibility; Ex-post individual rationality; Incentives; Interdependent value; Studies; Valuation methods; D51; Ex-post incentive compatibility; Interdependent value; Ex-post individual rationality; Efficient mechanisms; D82

The impossibility result by Jehiel and Moldovanu says that in a setting with interdependent valuations, any efficient and ex-post incentive compatible mechanism must be a constant mechanism. Mezzetti circumvents this problem by designing a two stage mechanism where the decision of allocation and pay...