Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments

• Published in: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics Vol. 90; p. 101645
• Main Authors: Trabelsi, Emna, Hichri, Walid
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier Inc 01.02.2021; Elsevier Science Ltd
• Subjects: Action; Banking; belief-based learning; central bank transparency; Central banks; choice reinforcement learning; convergence to equilibrium; Disclosure; Economics and Finance; Game theory; Games; Humanities and Social Sciences; Laboratories; Level-K; overreaction; Reinforcement; Social welfare; Strategies; Transparency; overreaction; Level-K; central bank transparency; choice reinforcement learning; convergence to equilibrium; E58; C91; belief-based learning; C92; D82

•Two laboratory experiments are run to test central bank partial transparency strategies: “fragmented information” strategy and “partially hidden information” strategy.•We provide original evidence that the “fragmented information” strategy outperforms the “partially hidden information” strategy in...