Heidegger on Existentiality, Constancy, and the Self

In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an account of the self in terms of his existential ontology. He contrasts his view to Cartesian and Kantian accounts, and seems to reject features that we take to be fundamental for a self, such as diachronic unity and being the subject of one's experiences...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInquiry (Oslo) Vol. 55; no. 5; pp. 454 - 472
Main Author Käufer, Stephan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Taylor & Francis 01.10.2012
Routledge
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Criteria
Diachronic analysis
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Existentialism
Heidegger, Martin
Identity
Ontology
Philosophers
Philosophy
Self-concept
Self-perception
Social accounts
Knowledge theory
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Summary:In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an account of the self in terms of his existential ontology. He contrasts his view to Cartesian and Kantian accounts, and seems to reject features that we take to be fundamental for a self, such as diachronic unity and being the subject of one's experiences. His positive account is obscured by the difficult vocabulary of authenticity and temporality. This paper traces Heidegger's argument, outlines his existential conception of the self, and shows how it fits the basic criteria for a self.
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ISSN:0020-174X
1502-3923
DOI:10.1080/0020174X.2012.716195