Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment

Natural resources such as water, for which the availability to users is random, are often shared according to predefined rules. What determines users’ choice of a sharing rule? To answer this question, we designed an experiment in which subjects: (1) vote on sharing rules; (2) choose the technology...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSocial choice and welfare Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 605 - 635
Main Authors Ouvrard, Benjamin, Ambec, Stefan, Reynaud, Arnaud, Cezera, Stéphane, Shivamurthy, Murudaiah
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.10.2022
Springer Nature B.V
Springer Verlag
Subjects
Agriculture
Crops
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Egalitarianism
Equal rights
Experiments
Fairness
Farmers
Fisheries
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Natural resources
Original Paper
Principles
Public Finance
Quantitative Finance
Self interest
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
Technology
Voting
Voting rules
Water rights
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Summary:Natural resources such as water, for which the availability to users is random, are often shared according to predefined rules. What determines users’ choice of a sharing rule? To answer this question, we designed an experiment in which subjects: (1) vote on sharing rules; (2) choose the technology that transforms the resource into payoffs; and (3) respond to a survey on their adhesion to principles of fairness. We find that although subjects tend to vote for the sharing rule that is aligned with their self-interest, they become more egalitarian if they report their views on the fairness principles before voting. Furthermore, the adhesion to fairness principles affects the subjects’ votes not directly but rather indirectly through the choice of technology.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-022-01400-y