Rectifying the Mischaracterization of Logic by Mental Model Theorists

• Published in: Cognitive science Vol. 44; no. 12; pp. e12898 - n/a
• Main Authors: Bringsjord, Selmer, Sundar Govindarajulu, Naveen
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01.12.2020
• Subjects: Cognitive ability; Formal logic; Logic; Mental models theory; Modal logic; Mental models theory; Modal logic; Logic; Formal logic
• ISSN: 0364-0213; 1551-6709; 1551-6709
• DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12898

Khemlani et al. (2018) mischaracterize logic in the course of seeking to show that mental model theory (MMT) can accommodate a form of inference (I, let us label it) they find in a high percentage of their subjects. We reveal their mischaracterization and, in so doing, lay a landscape for future modeling by cognitive scientists who may wonder whether human reasoning is consistent with, or perhaps even capturable by, reasoning in a logic or family thereof. Along the way, we note that the properties touted by Khemlani et al. as innovative aspects of MMT‐based modeling (e.g., nonmonotonicity) have for decades been, in logic, acknowledged and rigorously specified by families of (implemented) logics. Khemlani et al. (2018) further declare that I is “invalid in any modal logic.” We demonstrate this to be false by our introduction (Appendix A) of a new propositional modal logic (within a family of such logics) in which I is provably valid, and by the implementation of this logic. A second appendix, B, partially answers the two‐part question, “What is a formal logic, and what is it for one to capture empirical phenomena?”