Provably secure three-party key agreement protocol using Chebyshev chaotic maps in the standard model

• Published in: Nonlinear dynamics Vol. 77; no. 4; pp. 1427 - 1439
• Main Authors: Lai, Hong, Orgun, Mehmet A., Xiao, Jinghua, Pieprzyk, Josef, Xue, Liyin, Yang, Yixian
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.09.2014; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Agreements; Automotive Engineering; Chebyshev approximation; Classical Mechanics; Control; Dynamical Systems; Encryption; Engineering; Mechanical Engineering; Original Paper; Protocol; Protocol (computers); Pseudorandom; Security; Vibration; Standard model; Heuristic security; Enhanced Chebyshev chaotic maps; Pseudo-random function ensembles; Decisional Diffie–Hellman
• DOI: 10.1007/s11071-014-1388-z
• ISSN: 0924-090X

Recently, several key agreement protocols based on Chebyshev chaotic maps have been proposed in the literature. However, they can normally achieve “heuristic” security, that is, once drawbacks are found in these protocols, they are either modified to resist the new attacks, or are discarded. Under these circumstances, it is necessary and significant to define standard security models that can precisely characterize the capabilities of the participants and a potent adversary. Hence, we propose to use public key encryption based on enhanced Chebyshev chaotic maps and pseudo-random function ensembles to construct an efficient three-party key agreement protocol under the standard model, in which the adversary is able to make a wider range of queries and have more freedom than the other proposed schemes. In the design of our protocol, we follow the ideas in the recent key agreement protocol of Yang and Cao’s. The proposed protocol is shown to be provably secure if decisional Diffie–Hellman problem, which is based on Chebyshev chaotic maps, is computationally infeasible. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure 3PAKE protocol using Chebyshev chaotic maps under the standard model.