Reciprocal insurance among Kenyan pastoralists

In large areas of low and locally variable rainfall in East Africa, pastoralism is the only viable activity, and cattle are at risk of reduced milk output and even death in dry periods. The herders were nomadic, but following the Kenyan government’s scheme of giving titles to group ranches, they are...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTheoretical ecology Vol. 6; no. 2; pp. 173 - 187
Main Authors Dixit, Avinash K., Levin, Simon A., Rubenstein, Daniel I.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.05.2013
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Biomedical and Life Sciences
Cattle
Land use
Life Sciences
Milk
Natural resource management
Original Paper
Pastoralism
Pastures
Plant Sciences
Rain
Theoretical Ecology/Statistics
Zoology
Kenya
Variable rainfall
Pastoralism
Kenya
Self-enforcement
Insurance
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Summary:In large areas of low and locally variable rainfall in East Africa, pastoralism is the only viable activity, and cattle are at risk of reduced milk output and even death in dry periods. The herders were nomadic, but following the Kenyan government’s scheme of giving titles to group ranches, they are evolving reciprocity arrangements where a group suffering a dry period can send some of its cattle to graze on lands of another group that has better weather. We model such institutions using a repeated game framework. As these contracts are informal, we characterize schemes that are optimal subject to a self-enforcement or dynamic incentive compatibility condition. Where the actual arrangements differ from the predicted optima, we discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy and suggest avenues for further research.
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ISSN:1874-1738
1874-1746
DOI:10.1007/s12080-012-0169-x