Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

• Published in: Mathematical problems in engineering Vol. 2021; pp. 1 - 7
• Main Authors: Xu, Xiaodi, Wang, Zilong, Zhu, Yongfeng, Luo, Xiaochun
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Hindawi 2021; John Wiley & Sons, Inc
• Subjects: Collaboration; Cooperation; Decision making; Defense industry; Evolution; Game theory; Games; Innovations; Investigations; Military technology; Participation; R&D; Rationality; Regulation; Research & development; China
• ISSN: 1024-123X; 1563-5147
• DOI: 10.1155/2021/6698895

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.