Corruption and Rent-Seeking

• Published in: Public choice Vol. 113; no. 1/2; pp. 97 - 125
• Main Author: Lambsdorff, Johann Graf
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.10.2002; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Competition; Corruption; Corruption in government; Decision making; Economic competition; Economic costs; Economic models; Economic regulation; Economic rent; Economic Theories; Economic theory; Economics; Efficiency; Fines & penalties; Game Theory; Government corruption; Lobbying; Monopoly; Political corruption; Politicians; Principal-agent theory; Public choice; Public sector; Rent seeking behavior; Rent-Seeking; Studies; Subsidies; Theoretical Problems; Welfare; Welfare economics

The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it proposes that the former is the lesser of two evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources in the competition for preferential treatm...