Corruption and Rent-Seeking

The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it proposes that the former is the lesser of two evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources in the competition for preferential treatm...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic choice Vol. 113; no. 1/2; pp. 97 - 125
Main Author Lambsdorff, Johann Graf
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.10.2002
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
Abstract The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it proposes that the former is the lesser of two evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources in the competition for preferential treatment. This study shows that the traditional rent-seeking theory misunderstands three factors: first, the impact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent's size; second, corruption as a motivation for supplying preferential treatment and third; that corruption involves a narrower range of interests than those of competitive lobbying. Taking these factors into consideration, the opposite argument is valid: corruption has worse welfare implications than alternative rent-seeking activities.
AbstractList The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it proposes that the former is the lesser of two evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources in the competition for preferential treatment. This study shows that the traditional rent-seeking theory misunderstands three factors: first, the impact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent's size; second, corruption as a motivation for supplying preferential treatment and third; that corruption involves a narrower range of interests than those of competitive lobbying. Taking these factors into consideration, the opposite argument is valid: corruption has worse welfare implications than alternative rent-seeking activities. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it proposes that the former is the lesser of two evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources in the competition for preferential treatment. This study shows that the traditional rent-seeking theory misunderstands three factors: (1) the impact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent's size; (2) corruption as a motivation for supplying preferential treatment; & (3) corruption involves a narrower range of interests than those of competitive lobbying. Taking these factors into consideration, the opposite argument is valid: corruption has worse welfare implications than alternative rent-seeking activities. 71 References. Adapted from the source document.
The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it proposes that the former is the lesser of two evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources in the competition for preferential treatment. This study shows that the traditional rent-seeking theory misunderstands three factors: first, the impact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent's size; second, corruption as a motivation for supplying preferential treatment and third; that corruption involves a narrower range of interests than those of competitive lobbying. Taking these factors into consideration, the opposite argument is valid: corruption has worse welfare implications than alternative rent-seeking activities.
Author Lambsdorff, Johann Graf
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Johann Graf
  surname: Lambsdorff
  fullname: Lambsdorff, Johann Graf
BookMark eNqFz0tLw0AUBeBBKthW1y5EKC7cRe_MnUfGXQm-oCD4WIdpciOJ7UydSRb-eyN15UY4cDYfB86MTXzwxNgphysOAq-XN2MB_sQooQ_YlCuDmeHAJ2wKIPNM5cIesVlKHQCgztWUnRUhxmHXt8EvnK8Xz-T77IXoo_Xvx-ywcZtEJ789Z293t6_FQ7Z6un8slqusQiP6TJpGUMVlA1xiDUKuq8bWTlqoBSnH1wIarm3lcm0b0FY4TRVqRU6hVYJwzi73u7sYPgdKfbltU0WbjfMUhlRq0IJLK_-FaDmgsnyEF39gF4boxxOlAANWj2ZE53vUpT7EchfbrYtfJQIIZYzCbz36Ynk
CODEN PUCHBX
CitedBy_id crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ejpoleco_2021_102140
crossref_primary_10_1108_IJIF_07_2018_0073
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10551_011_0947_1
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3197653
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3001262
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10368_021_00496_4
crossref_primary_10_1108_CMS_06_2020_0233
crossref_primary_10_1142_S1084946723500231
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10551_013_1789_9
crossref_primary_10_3390_su13126870
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_756066
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2153739
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_019_00758_5
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jdeveco_2017_10_009
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2402579
crossref_primary_10_3917_med_185_0133
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10602_020_09311_9
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_techsoc_2021_101532
crossref_primary_10_1046_j_0023_5962_2003_00233_x
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2387650
crossref_primary_10_1108_TG_01_2022_0013
crossref_primary_10_1007_s00191_010_0174_4
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2789293
crossref_primary_10_1002_epa2_1201
crossref_primary_10_1177_0951629805056895
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11138_020_00501_0
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11205_013_0560_z
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1910227
crossref_primary_10_1093_jla_lav009
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijpe_2023_109134
crossref_primary_10_1142_S2630531319500057
crossref_primary_10_1017_psrm_2023_13
crossref_primary_10_1017_err_2018_52
crossref_primary_10_1080_17487870_2016_1258312
crossref_primary_10_22630_RNR_2013_100_3_43
crossref_primary_10_1093_jleo_ewp013
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_015_0297_0
crossref_primary_10_1177_0951692803015003006
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jwb_2017_06_004
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2053677
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10797_019_09560_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_023_01082_9
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11149_017_9338_6
crossref_primary_10_5902_2357797586919
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2389734
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_enpol_2019_111231
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jup_2017_08_005
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1700136
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jce_2017_08_002
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1836905
crossref_primary_10_1080_1540496X_2022_2153591
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jenvman_2021_113686
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jpubeco_2022_104799
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2363461
crossref_primary_10_1177_0169796X221148519
crossref_primary_10_21272_mmi_2019_4_21
crossref_primary_10_1146_annurev_polisci_052715_111917
crossref_primary_10_1108_17538290910935873
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_soscij_2014_12_011
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10611_017_9727_x
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2678566
crossref_primary_10_1177_0095399719854367
crossref_primary_10_3390_economies10120326
crossref_primary_10_1017_S1744137422000467
crossref_primary_10_1080_07900627_2019_1674132
crossref_primary_10_1080_03003930_2019_1585816
crossref_primary_10_1002_pam_22535
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2387660
crossref_primary_10_1002_jid_3723
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11366_013_9259_x
crossref_primary_10_1080_17502977_2015_1033093
crossref_primary_10_1108_MBR_07_2017_0050
crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1477_8947_2012_01456_x
crossref_primary_10_1080_17565529_2024_2342683
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_techfore_2021_120993
crossref_primary_10_1108_JFC_07_2020_0147
crossref_primary_10_1002_bse_3331
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3802892
crossref_primary_10_1108_02651330911001332
crossref_primary_10_1007_s40797_021_00150_7
crossref_primary_10_1111_twec_12488
crossref_primary_10_1515_jbnst_2015_1003
crossref_primary_10_1007_BF02761488
crossref_primary_10_15388_Polit_2020_99_1
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4601078
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10690_023_09438_3
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_resourpol_2019_01_016
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2531307
crossref_primary_10_1108_JFC_11_2021_0243
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2183063
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijinfomgt_2021_102349
crossref_primary_10_1111_coep_12025
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4232628
crossref_primary_10_1142_S2194565923500136
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2208356
crossref_primary_10_1590_0034_7612140185
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1920298
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_014_0206_y
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11187_022_00649_y
crossref_primary_10_1080_10758216_2019_1634478
crossref_primary_10_1093_ser_mwz039
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2079471
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3090994
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1949062
crossref_primary_10_1111_pbaf_12282
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_353880
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4399638
crossref_primary_10_1017_S0003055410000523
crossref_primary_10_1080_13562576_2015_1052348
crossref_primary_10_1525_cpcs_2023_1824787
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_018_0592_7
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_018_0610_9
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_023_01102_8
crossref_primary_10_1002_pa_2737
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_soscij_2016_08_003
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1273561
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jce_2022_10_004
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1813102
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_024_01169_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_022_00959_5
crossref_primary_10_1057_s41287_016_0060_5
crossref_primary_10_1177_0972652712466501
crossref_primary_10_15407_etet2020_04_065
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_resourpol_2020_101841
crossref_primary_10_1017_prp_2017_24
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ejpoleco_2014_02_005
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1010602
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_irle_2009_03_001
crossref_primary_10_1111_1744_7941_12120
crossref_primary_10_4236_jmf_2016_65051
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jclepro_2021_126505
crossref_primary_10_1093_aler_ahaa004
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_seps_2018_02_002
crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_009_9423_1
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10551_022_05172_4
crossref_primary_10_1093_jleo_ewv017
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2175742
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijinfomgt_2018_11_014
crossref_primary_10_2478_auseb_2020_0002
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10602_016_9215_9
crossref_primary_10_1057_jdhf_2008_2
crossref_primary_10_1177_15270025221134239
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10551_013_1646_x
crossref_primary_10_1007_s10490_014_9406_8
crossref_primary_10_1177_1465116520916248
ContentType Journal Article
Copyright Copyright 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers Oct 2002
Copyright_xml – notice: Copyright 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers
– notice: Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers Oct 2002
DBID 0-V
3V.
7UB
7WY
7WZ
7XB
87Z
88C
88J
8AO
8BJ
8FI
8FJ
8FK
8FL
8G5
ABUWG
AFKRA
ALSLI
AZQEC
BENPR
BEZIV
CCPQU
DPSOV
DWQXO
FQK
FRNLG
FYUFA
F~G
GHDGH
GNUQQ
GUQSH
HEHIP
JBE
K60
K6~
K8~
KC-
L.-
M0C
M0T
M2L
M2O
M2R
M2S
MBDVC
PQBIZ
PQBZA
PQEST
PQQKQ
PQUKI
Q9U
DOI 10.1023/A:1020320327526
DatabaseName ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection
ProQuest Central (Corporate)
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
ABI/INFORM Collection
ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)
ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)
ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)
Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)
Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Pharma Collection
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
Hospital Premium Collection
Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)
ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)
Research Library (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Central (Alumni)
ProQuest Central UK/Ireland
Social Science Premium Collection
ProQuest Central Essentials
ProQuest Central
Business Premium Collection
ProQuest One Community College
Politics Collection
ProQuest Central Korea
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
Business Premium Collection (Alumni)
Health Research Premium Collection
ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)
Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)
ProQuest Central Student
Research Library Prep
Sociology Collection
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Business Collection
DELNET Management Collection
ProQuest Politics Collection
ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced
ABI/INFORM Global
Healthcare Administration Database
Political Science Database
Research Library
Social Science Database
Sociology Database
Research Library (Corporate)
ProQuest One Business
ProQuest One Business (Alumni)
ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)
ProQuest One Academic
ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition
ProQuest Central Basic
DatabaseTitle ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)
ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest One Business
Research Library Prep
ProQuest Central Student
ProQuest Central Essentials
ProQuest Social Science Journals (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest One Community College
Research Library (Alumni Edition)
Politics Collection
ProQuest Pharma Collection
ABI/INFORM Complete
ProQuest Central
ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced
Health Research Premium Collection
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
ProQuest Central Korea
ProQuest Research Library
ProQuest Sociology Collection
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
ProQuest Sociology
ABI/INFORM Complete (Alumni Edition)
Business Premium Collection
Social Science Premium Collection
ABI/INFORM Global
ProQuest Political Science
ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Central Basic
ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition
ProQuest Health Management
ProQuest Hospital Collection
Sociology Collection
Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)
ProQuest Business Collection
ProQuest Hospital Collection (Alumni)
ProQuest Social Science Journals
ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection
ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition
ProQuest Health Management (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest DELNET Management Collection
ProQuest One Business (Alumni)
ProQuest Politics Collection
ProQuest One Academic
ProQuest Central (Alumni)
Business Premium Collection (Alumni)
DatabaseTitleList ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Database_xml – sequence: 1
  dbid: BENPR
  name: ProQuest Central
  url: https://www.proquest.com/central
  sourceTypes: Aggregation Database
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Economics
Political Science
EISSN 1573-7101
EndPage 125
ExternalDocumentID 331762151
30025775
Genre Feature
GroupedDBID -4X
-57
-5G
-BR
-DZ
-EM
-Y2
-~C
.86
0-V
06D
0R~
0VY
123
199
1N0
1SB
203
29P
2J2
2JN
2JY
2KG
2KM
2LR
2P1
2VQ
2~H
3-Y
30V
3V.
4.4
406
408
409
40D
40E
53G
5VS
63O
67Z
6NX
78A
7WY
8AO
8FI
8FJ
8FL
8G5
8H~
8TC
8UJ
8V8
95-
95.
95~
96X
AAAVM
AABCJ
AABHQ
AABYN
AAFGU
AAGAY
AAHNG
AAIAL
AAJKR
AANZL
AARHV
AARTL
AATNV
AATVU
AAUYE
AAWCG
AAYFA
AAYIU
AAYQN
AAYTO
ABBBX
ABBHK
ABBXA
ABDZT
ABECU
ABECW
ABFGW
ABFTD
ABFTV
ABHLI
ABHQN
ABJNI
ABJOX
ABKAS
ABKCH
ABKTR
ABKVW
ABLJU
ABMNI
ABMQK
ABNWP
ABQBU
ABSXP
ABTAH
ABTDC
ABTEG
ABTHY
ABTKH
ABTMW
ABULA
ABUWG
ABWNU
ABXPI
ABXSQ
ABYRZ
ABYYQ
ACAOD
ACBMV
ACBRV
ACBXY
ACBYP
ACGFS
ACHQT
ACHSB
ACHXU
ACIGE
ACIPQ
ACKNC
ACMDZ
ACMLO
ACNCT
ACNXV
ACOKC
ACOMO
ACTTH
ACVFL
ACVWB
ACWMK
ACZOJ
ADBBV
ADGDI
ADHHG
ADHIR
ADIMF
ADINQ
ADKNI
ADKPE
ADMDM
ADMHP
ADOXG
ADPTO
ADRFC
ADTPH
ADULT
ADURQ
ADYFF
ADZKW
AEBTG
AEFTE
AEGAL
AEGNC
AEJHL
AEJRE
AEKMD
AEOHA
AEPYU
AESKC
AESTI
AETLH
AEUPB
AEVLU
AEVTX
AEXYK
AFDAS
AFDYV
AFFNX
AFGCZ
AFKRA
AFLOW
AFNRJ
AFQWF
AFWTZ
AFZKB
AGAYW
AGDGC
AGGBP
AGJBK
AGMZJ
AGQMX
AGWIL
AGWZB
AGYKE
AHAJD
AHBYD
AHEXP
AHSBF
AHYZX
AIAKS
AILAN
AIMYW
AITGF
AJBLW
AJDOV
AJRNO
AJZVZ
AKQUC
AKVCP
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
ALSLI
ALWAN
AMKLP
AMXSW
AMYLF
AMYQR
AOCGG
AQUVI
ARALO
ARMRJ
ASOEW
AXYYD
AYQZM
AZFZN
AZQEC
AZRUE
B-.
BA0
BAPOH
BDATZ
BENPR
BEZIV
BGNMA
BHNFS
BPHCQ
BVXVI
CAG
CBXGM
CCPQU
CHNMF
COF
CS3
CSCUP
CWXUR
CZBKB
DDRTE
DL5
DNIVK
DPSOV
DPUIP
DU5
DWQXO
EBLON
EBO
EBS
EBU
EHE
EIOEI
EJD
EOH
ESBYG
F5P
FEDTE
FERAY
FFXSO
FIGPU
FINBP
FNLPD
FRNLG
FRRFC
FSGXE
FWDCC
FYUFA
GGCAI
GGRSB
GJIRD
GNUQQ
GNWQR
GPZZG
GQ6
GQ7
GQ8
GROUPED_ABI_INFORM_ARCHIVE
GROUPED_ABI_INFORM_COMPLETE
GROUPED_ABI_INFORM_RESEARCH
GUQSH
GXS
HECYW
HEHIP
HF~
HG5
HG6
HMJXF
HQYDN
HRMNR
HVGLF
HZ~
I09
IHE
IJ-
IKXTQ
ITM
IWAJR
IXC
IZIGR
IZQ
I~X
I~Z
J-C
J0Z
JAAYA
JAB
JBMMH
JBSCW
JBU
JCJTX
JENOY
JHFFW
JKQEH
JLEZI
JLXEF
JPL
JPPEU
JSODD
JST
JZLTJ
K1G
K60
K6~
K8~
KC-
KDC
KOV
LAK
LLZTM
M0C
M0T
M2L
M2O
M2R
M2S
M4Y
MA-
MQGED
N2Q
N9A
NB0
NPVJJ
NQJWS
NU0
O9-
O93
O9G
O9I
O9J
OAM
OVD
P19
P2P
P9M
PF-
PQBIZ
PQQKQ
PROAC
PT4
PT5
Q2X
QOK
QOS
R-Y
R89
R9I
RHV
RIG
RNI
RNS
ROL
RPX
RSV
RZC
RZD
S16
S27
S3B
SA0
SAP
SBE
SCF
SDH
SDM
SHX
SISQX
SJYHP
SNE
SNPRN
SNX
SOHCF
SOJ
SPISZ
SRMVM
SSLCW
STPWE
SZN
T13
TEORI
TH9
TKY
TN5
TSG
TSK
TSV
TUC
U2A
UG4
UKHRP
UNUBA
UOJIU
UTJUX
UZXMN
VC2
VFIZW
VQA
W23
W48
WH7
WK8
YLTOR
Z45
Z7U
Z7Z
Z81
Z83
Z8T
Z8U
Z8W
ZCA
ZCG
ZMTXR
ZY4
~8M
~EX
7UB
7XB
8BJ
8FK
AACDK
AAHCP
AAJBT
AASML
ABAKF
ACDTI
ACUHF
ADACV
AEFQL
AEMSY
AFBBN
AGQEE
AGRTI
AIGIU
ALIPV
APTMU
FQK
IPSME
JBE
L.-
MBDVC
PQBZA
PQEST
PQUKI
Q9U
AAYZH
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-c372t-47f2ec14f0143d024bcf9da490d2e5a1b20f169ca869f0692a6ec365ea53952e3
IEDL.DBID BENPR
ISSN 0048-5829
IngestDate Fri Oct 25 14:37:57 EDT 2024
Sat Oct 26 00:29:07 EDT 2024
Thu Oct 10 20:56:31 EDT 2024
Fri Feb 02 07:04:08 EST 2024
IsPeerReviewed true
IsScholarly true
Issue 1/2
Language English
LinkModel DirectLink
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c372t-47f2ec14f0143d024bcf9da490d2e5a1b20f169ca869f0692a6ec365ea53952e3
Notes ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
PQID 207096913
PQPubID 34409
PageCount 29
ParticipantIDs proquest_miscellaneous_60621494
proquest_miscellaneous_39103591
proquest_journals_207096913
jstor_primary_30025775
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 2002-10-01
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2002-10-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 10
  year: 2002
  text: 2002-10-01
  day: 01
PublicationDecade 2000
PublicationPlace Dordrecht
PublicationPlace_xml – name: Dordrecht
PublicationTitle Public choice
PublicationYear 2002
Publisher Kluwer Academic Publishers
Springer Nature B.V
Publisher_xml – name: Kluwer Academic Publishers
– name: Springer Nature B.V
SSID ssj0003685
Score 2.0785906
Snippet The rent-seeking theory was one of the first economic instruments developed to model corruption in the public sector. Comparing corruption with lobbying, it...
SourceID proquest
jstor
SourceType Aggregation Database
Publisher
StartPage 97
SubjectTerms Competition
Corruption
Corruption in government
Decision making
Economic competition
Economic costs
Economic models
Economic regulation
Economic rent
Economic Theories
Economic theory
Economics
Efficiency
Fines & penalties
Game Theory
Government corruption
Lobbying
Monopoly
Political corruption
Politicians
Principal-agent theory
Public choice
Public sector
Rent seeking behavior
Rent-Seeking
Studies
Subsidies
Theoretical Problems
Welfare
Welfare economics
Title Corruption and Rent-Seeking
URI https://www.jstor.org/stable/30025775
https://www.proquest.com/docview/207096913
https://search.proquest.com/docview/39103591
https://search.proquest.com/docview/60621494
Volume 113
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwfV09T8MwED3RdoAFQaGiFEoGVkuJvxJPqFStKoYKFSp1ixx_jElp2v-PnbgdQDDHkZWcfXd-9_wO4JnbtIh1wpALlRxRxT3QRASSmbaxzgolTKP2ueSLNX3bsE3g5tSBVnn0iY2j1pXyGLlHQly2LRLysv1CvmmUL66GDhod6GF3UMBd6L3Olu-rkyv26uptidlfL8Lih7ZP0z2c4JR5aYWWjvjLJTdxZn4FlyFBjCatRa_hzJR9OD_eH677cBUoa25Q2Jg3MJpWu92h2f2RLHW0cqEEfRjjcfBbWM9nn9MFCm0PkCIp3iOaWmxUQq2X3tMuhhbKCi2piDU2TCYFjm3ChZIZFzbmAktuFOHMSEYEw4YMoFtWpbmDCDObeJQnU9ZQ93qRKWqpEYoVqZBEDmHQfHW-baUtcuJzoDRlQxgdf0MeFnWdn0wwhKfTU7cafYlBlqY61Dlx2QdhIvl7hDswOVsJev_vDCO4aNuueNbcA3T3u4N5dNF_X4yDjcfQWePJN9Z8rVY
link.rule.ids 315,783,787,21402,27938,27939,33758,33759,43819,74638
linkProvider ProQuest
linkToHtml http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwfV3PT8IwFH5ROODFIEpEVHbw2mTrr60nowSCisQgJNyWrmuPAxn8_7Zb4aDR87o07Xt97_W9r98DeOAmzsI8Ysi6So6o4i7RRASSSW7CPMmU0BXb54xPlvR1xVYem1N6WOXBJlaGOl8rlyN3mRAbbYuIPG6-kGsa5YqrvoPGKTQdU5VV6ubzaPYxP5pix65el5jd8yIsfnD7VN3DCY6Zo1ao4Yi_THLlZ8ZtOPcBYvBUS_QCTnTRgdbh_XDZgbaHrNlB_mBeQn-43m731ekPZJEHc-tK0KfWLg9-BcvxaDGcIN_2ACkS4x2iscFaRdQ46r3c-tBMGZFLKsIcayajDIcm4kLJhAsTcoEl14pwpiUjgmFNutAo1oW-hgAzE7ksT6KMpvb3LFHUUC0Uy2IhiexBt1p1uqmpLVLiYqA4Zj3oH7Yh9UpdpkcR9GBw_Gq10ZUYZKHX-zIlNvogTER_j7AXJmxvZfTm3xkG0Jos3qfp9GX21oezugWLQ9DdQmO33es7Gwnssnsv728eWq9n
linkToPdf http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwfV07T8MwED5BKwELKoWKUqAZWC0SvxJPCEqr8lBVFSp1ixzHHpPSx__HTtwOIJjjKErucnf-7vx9AHfcxFmYRwzZVMkRVdwBTUQgmeQmzJNMCV2xfU74eE5fF2zhKYXWfqxyFxOrQJ2XymHkDgmx1baIyL3xUxHT59HD8gs5ASnXaPVqGofQjKl1qgY0n4aT6Wwflh3Tet1udkeNsPjB81MpiRMcM0ezUI8m_grPVc4ZteDUF4vBY23dMzjQRRuOd2eJ121o-fE1u8j_pOfQG5Sr1baKBIEs8mBm0wr60Nph4hcwHw0_B2PkJRCQIjHeIBobrFVEjaPhy20-zZQRuaQizLFmMspwaCIulEy4MCEXWHKtCGdaMiIY1qQDjaIs9CUEmJnIIT6JMpra27NEUUO1UCyLhSSyC53qrdNlTXORElcPxTHrQm_3GVLv4Ot0b44u9PdXrWe6doMsdLldp8RWIoSJ6O8VdvOE7Q6NXv37hD4cWVOn7y-Ttx6c1GosbpjuGhqb1Vbf2KJgk916c38DQLyzmw
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Corruption+and+Rent-Seeking&rft.jtitle=Public+choice&rft.au=Lambsdoreff%2C+Johann+Graf&rft.date=2002-10-01&rft.issn=0048-5829&rft.volume=113&rft.issue=1-2&rft.spage=97&rft.epage=125&rft_id=info:doi/10.1023%2FA%3A1020320327526&rft.externalDBID=NO_FULL_TEXT
thumbnail_l http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0048-5829&client=summon
thumbnail_m http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0048-5829&client=summon
thumbnail_s http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0048-5829&client=summon