Greening the career incentive structure for local officials in China: Does less pollution increase the chances of promotion for Chinese local leaders?

• Published in: Journal of environmental economics and management Vol. 107; p. 102440
• Main Authors: Wu, Mingqin, Cao, Xun
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.05.2021; Elsevier B.V
• Subjects: Air pollution; Air quality management; Analysis; Career incentive structure; China; Environmental law; Local leader promotion; Pollution; Sustainable living; Pollution; Career incentive structure; Local leader promotion; China

Does it pay to be “greener” as a local official in China? In this paper, we examine the effect of local environment regulation outcomes, i.e., local pollution, on leaders’ chances of promotion. This is an important question because only when the Chinese cadre evaluation system rewards local official...