Punishment in optional public goods games

In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inChinese physics B Vol. 19; no. 11; pp. 30 - 34
Main Author 王震 许照锦 张连众
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published IOP Publishing 01.11.2010
Subjects
公共产品
公共物品
反应动力学
平衡点
微观模型
有限理性
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ISSN1674-1056
2058-3834
DOI10.1088/1674-1056/19/11/110201

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Summary:In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.
Bibliography:O414.1
public goods games, rationality, equilibrium
11-5639/O4
F062.6
ISSN:1674-1056
2058-3834
DOI:10.1088/1674-1056/19/11/110201