Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes

• Published in: Theory and decision Vol. 97; no. 2; pp. 299 - 310
• Main Author: Thomson, William
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer US 01.09.2024; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Agents; Assignment; Axioms; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Constraints; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Endowment; Finance; Game Theory; Insurance; Management; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Social and Behav. Sciences; Statistics for Business; Welfare; Pre-delivery-proofness; Resource allocation rules; Withdrawal-proofness; Endowment-splitting-proofness; Constrained priority rules; Endowments-merging-proofness

In the context of classical exchange economies, we study four ways in which agents can strategically take advantage of allocation rules by affecting who participates and on what terms (Thomson in Soc Choice Welf 42:289–311, 2014). (1) An agent transfers their endowment to someone else and withdraws....