LOGIC's CARETAKER-WITTGENSTEIN, LOGIC, AND THE VANISHMENT OF RUSSELL's PARADOX

• Published in: The Philosophical forum Vol. 35; no. 3; pp. 281 - 309
• Main Author: JOLLEY, KELLY DEAN
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK and Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2004; Blackwell
• Subjects: 20th century; Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas); Logic of Language; Logical Form; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Russell, Bertrand Arthur William; Sentences; Well Formedness; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johan; Century 19-20; Philosophy history; Logics; Wittgenstein (L.); Russell's Paradox
• ISSN: 0031-806X; 1467-9191
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2004.00175.x

Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim, made at the end of Tractatus 3.333, that he has made Bertrand Russell's paradox vanish is explained by demonstrating the Fregean origin of Wittgenstein's new analysis of Socrates is mortal, which by using transparent symbolism that differentiates subject & predicate eliminates the need for Russell's theory of logical types to prevent transgressions of proper logical form; subject & predicate symbols cannot be switched because the former fits into the latter, not vice versa. Logic is required to be self-sufficient, & ordinary language is always in logical order as no sentence can be ill-formed; any sentence is a combination of expressions that may be combined in just that manner, as the elements of logical space are sentential, not subsentential as conceived by Russell. As there are no expressions that are possible but impermissible, there is no problem for the theory of types to solve or forestall; it follows that Russell's paradox is nonexistent. J. Hitchcock