A table masking countermeasure for low-energy secure embedded systems

• Published in: IEEE transactions on very large scale integration (VLSI) systems Vol. 14; no. 7; pp. 740 - 753
• Main Author: Gebotys, C.H.
• Format: Journal Article Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: Piscataway, NJ IEEE 01.07.2006; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Applied sciences; Communication system security; Countermeasure; Countermeasures; Design. Technologies. Operation analysis. Testing; Devices; differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA); differential power analysis (DPA); Electrical resistance measurement; Electromagnetic analysis; Electromagnetic measurements; Electronic equipment and fabrication. Passive components, printed wiring boards, connectics; Electronics; Embedded system; Energy dissipation; Exact sciences and technology; Integrated circuits; Integrated circuits by function (including memories and processors); Masking; Microelectronic fabrication (materials and surfaces technology); Microprocessors; Military technology; Personal digital assistants; Power measurement; Power system security; Resists; Security; Semiconductor electronics. Microelectronics. Optoelectronics. Solid state devices; smartcard; Tables (data); Very large scale integration; Side channel attack; Second order; Processor; Third order; differential power analysis (DPA); Countermeasure; Bus(channel); differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA); smartcard; Boarded computer; Microelectronic fabrication; Embedded systems; security; Power consumption; Energy dissipation; Interconnection; Integrated circuit; Resist; Masking; Low-power electronics
• DOI: 10.1109/TVLSI.2006.878344
• ISSN: 1063-8210

Future wireless embedded devices will be increasingly powerful, supporting many more applications, including one of the most crucial, which is security. Although many embedded devices offer more resistance to bus probing attacks due to their compact size, susceptibility to power or electromagnetic analysis attacks must be analyzed. This paper presents a table masking countermeasure to resist differential power analysis (DPA) and differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA). Real power and EM measurements are used to verify the countermeasure using second- and third-order DPA and DEMA attacks on a popular low-energy embedded ARM processor. Results show that the new table masking countermeasure provides increased security without large overheads of energy dissipation compared with previous countermeasures. With the emergence of security applications personal digital assistants, cellphones, and other embedded devices, low-energy countermeasures for resistance to DPA/DEMA are crucial for supporting future wireless embedded systems