Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules

A new property for collective aggregation rules called positive discrimination is introduced. This property is satisfied by many anonymous and neutral collective aggregation rules. We discuss unimodal profiles (or distributions) for which this property on its own determines the outcome as the mode o...

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Published inJournal of mathematical economics Vol. 87; pp. 56 - 66
Main Authors Chatterjee, Swarnendu, Storcken, Ton
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.03.2020
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Subjects
Affirmative action
Agglomeration
Borda rule
Condorcet consistent rule
Discrimination
Frequency analysis
Plurality rule
Probability distribution
Property
Unimodal distribution
Voters
Voting
Plurality rule
Voting
Unimodal distribution
Condorcet consistent rule
Borda rule
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Abstract A new property for collective aggregation rules called positive discrimination is introduced. This property is satisfied by many anonymous and neutral collective aggregation rules. We discuss unimodal profiles (or distributions) for which this property on its own determines the outcome as the mode of a unimodal distribution. We investigate relaxations of this unimodal distribution condition and show that the Condorcet consistent rules as well as the Borda rule and the plurality rule have the mode as the outcome at such profiles. Further, we show, by an example, how the addition of unimodal profiles and the property of positive discrimination can help to determine an outcome in the case of a large number of voters.
AbstractList A new property for collective aggregation rules called positive discrimination is introduced. This property is satisfied by many anonymous and neutral collective aggregation rules. We discuss unimodal profiles (or distributions) for which this property on its own determines the outcome as the mode of a unimodal distribution. We investigate relaxations of this unimodal distribution condition and show that the Condorcet consistent rules as well as the Borda rule and the plurality rule have the mode as the outcome at such profiles. Further, we show, by an example, how the addition of unimodal profiles and the property of positive discrimination can help to determine an outcome in the case of a large number of voters.
Author Storcken, Ton
Chatterjee, Swarnendu
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  email: t.storcken@maastrichtuniversity.nl
  organization: Department of Quantitative Economics, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, Netherlands
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Cites_doi 10.1007/s00355-017-1086-0
10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00012-9
10.2307/1912699
10.1016/0022-0531(78)90057-1
10.2307/2110925
10.1002/bs.3830220304
10.1007/s00355-003-0269-z
10.1006/jeth.1999.2541
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Keywords Plurality rule
Voting
Unimodal distribution
Condorcet consistent rule
Borda rule
Language English
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Snippet A new property for collective aggregation rules called positive discrimination is introduced. This property is satisfied by many anonymous and neutral...
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SubjectTerms Affirmative action
Agglomeration
Borda rule
Condorcet consistent rule
Discrimination
Frequency analysis
Plurality rule
Probability distribution
Property
Unimodal distribution
Voters
Voting
Title Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules
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