Informativeness and Moore's Paradox

It is argued that a) non-intentional systems can exhibit what is intuitively reconizable as Moorean absurdity; b) that main-stream accounts of Moore's paradox cannot explain this; c) that an alternative account focused on informativeness (or information-giving) can explain it; d) that an accoun...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inAnalysis (Oxford) Vol. 68; no. 1; pp. 46 - 57
Main Author Pagin, Peter
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.01.2008
Blackwell Publishing
Subjects
Assertion
Barometers
belief
Conditional probabilities
Electric current
evidence
Filosofiämnen
Historisk-filosofiska ämnen
History and philosophy subjects
HUMANIORA och RELIGIONSVETENSKAP
HUMANITIES and RELIGION
Inference
information
Justified beliefs
Moore's paradox
Paradoxes
Philosophy subjects
Rationality
Television broadcasting
Television programs
Teoretisk filosofi
Theoretical philosophy
Truth
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0003-2638
1467-8284
1467-8284
DOI10.1093/analys/68.1.46

Cover

More Information
Summary:It is argued that a) non-intentional systems can exhibit what is intuitively reconizable as Moorean absurdity; b) that main-stream accounts of Moore's paradox cannot explain this; c) that an alternative account focused on informativeness (or information-giving) can explain it; d) that an account of assertoric force as prima facie informativeness is plausible; e) that the informativeness account of Moorean absurdity can explain standard examples of Moore's paradox in virtue of this theory of assertion.
Bibliography:istex:82C8B6BAAE2B526F5494DB2D2F9922386BADC189
ark:/67375/HXZ-X7NN9W6B-W
ISSN:0003-2638
1467-8284
1467-8284
DOI:10.1093/analys/68.1.46