A Stackelberg reinsurance-investment game with asymmetric information and delay

This paper investigates a Stackelberg stochastic differential reinsurance-investment game problem, in which the reinsurer is the leader and the insurer is the follower. The unequal status of the reinsurer and the insurer in the financial market is characterized by the asymmetric information model. W...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inOptimization Vol. 70; no. 10; pp. 2131 - 2168
Main Authors Bai, Yanfei, Zhou, Zhongbao, Xiao, Helu, Gao, Rui
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Philadelphia Taylor & Francis 03.10.2021
Taylor & Francis LLC
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