Differential Electromagnetic Attacks on a 32-bit Microprocessor Using Software Defined Radios

• Published in: IEEE transactions on information forensics and security Vol. 8; no. 12; pp. 2101 - 2114
• Main Authors: Montminy, David P., Baldwin, Rusty O., Temple, Michael A., Oxley, Mark E.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, NY IEEE 01.12.2013; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
• Subjects: Applied sciences; Bandwidth; Broadcasting. Videocommunications. Audiovisual; Computer science; control theory; systems; Correlation; Cryptography; differential attack; Encryption; Exact sciences and technology; frequency mapping; information leakage; Information, signal and communications theory; Memory and file management (including protection and security); Memory organisation. Data processing; Oscilloscopes; Radiocommunications; Side-channel analysis; Signal and communications theory; Software; software defined radio; Software radio; sub-Nyquist; Telecommunications; Telecommunications and information theory; Television; Side channel attack; Differential cryptanalysis; frequency mapping; Electromagnetism; Digital television; Leak; software defined radio; Television receiver; Real time; sub-Nyquist; Frequency effect; Physical attacks; Differential analyzer; differential attack; Side-channel analysis; Private key; information leakage; Public key; Nyquist criterion; Microprocessor; Cryptography; Computer security; Software radio
• ISSN: 1556-6013; 1556-6021
• DOI: 10.1109/TIFS.2013.2287600

Side-channel analysis has been used to successfully attack many cryptographic systems. However, to improve trace quality and make collection of side-channel data easier, the attacker typically modifies the target device to add a trigger signal. This trigger implies a very powerful attacker with virtually complete control over the device. This paper describes a method to collect side-channel data using a software defined radio (SDR) in real-time without requiring a collection device trigger. A correlation-based frequency-dependent leakage mapping technique is introduced to evaluate a 32-bit microprocessor, revealing that individual key bytes leak at different frequencies. Key byte-dependent leakage is observed in both SDR collected and triggered oscilloscope-based collections (which serve to validate the SDR data). This research is the first to demonstrate effective differential attack using SDRs. Successful attacks are presented using two SDRs, including a US20 digital television receiver with modified drivers.