Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject to reference-dependent preferences, loss-aversion, and probability-weighting, to the share they would receive on choosing by maximising expect...
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Published in | Journal of economic dynamics & control Vol. 137; p. 104332 |
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Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
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Abstract | I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject to reference-dependent preferences, loss-aversion, and probability-weighting, to the share they would receive on choosing by maximising expected utility instead. I show that: (i) reference-dependent preferences are unambiguously advantageous, (ii) loss-aversion does not have any effect, and (iii) probability-weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. Finally, when these three features come together so that the decision-making process is described by cumulative prospect theory, then a higher share is obtained if and only if the advantage conferred by reference-dependent preferences is stronger than the disadvantage imposed by probability-weighting, and I present a precise necessary and sufficient condition that expresses this trade-off. |
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AbstractList | I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject to reference-dependent preferences, loss-aversion, and probability-weighting, to the share they would receive on choosing by maximising expected utility instead. I show that: (i) reference-dependent preferences are unambiguously advantageous, (ii) loss-aversion does not have any effect, and (iii) probability-weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. Finally, when these three features come together so that the decision-making process is described by cumulative prospect theory, then a higher share is obtained if and only if the advantage conferred by reference-dependent preferences is stronger than the disadvantage imposed by probability-weighting, and I present a precise necessary and sufficient condition that expresses this trade-off. |
ArticleNumber | 104332 |
Author | Khan, Abhimanyu |
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Keywords | D01 C78 Reference-dependent preference Cumulative prospect theory Probability-weighting Loss-aversion Bargaining Evolution D90 Expected utility D81 C73 D83 |
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