Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining

I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject to reference-dependent preferences, loss-aversion, and probability-weighting, to the share they would receive on choosing by maximising expect...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic dynamics & control Vol. 137; p. 104332
Main Author Khan, Abhimanyu
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.04.2022
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
Abstract I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject to reference-dependent preferences, loss-aversion, and probability-weighting, to the share they would receive on choosing by maximising expected utility instead. I show that: (i) reference-dependent preferences are unambiguously advantageous, (ii) loss-aversion does not have any effect, and (iii) probability-weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. Finally, when these three features come together so that the decision-making process is described by cumulative prospect theory, then a higher share is obtained if and only if the advantage conferred by reference-dependent preferences is stronger than the disadvantage imposed by probability-weighting, and I present a precise necessary and sufficient condition that expresses this trade-off.
AbstractList I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject to reference-dependent preferences, loss-aversion, and probability-weighting, to the share they would receive on choosing by maximising expected utility instead. I show that: (i) reference-dependent preferences are unambiguously advantageous, (ii) loss-aversion does not have any effect, and (iii) probability-weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. Finally, when these three features come together so that the decision-making process is described by cumulative prospect theory, then a higher share is obtained if and only if the advantage conferred by reference-dependent preferences is stronger than the disadvantage imposed by probability-weighting, and I present a precise necessary and sufficient condition that expresses this trade-off.
ArticleNumber 104332
Author Khan, Abhimanyu
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Abhimanyu
  surname: Khan
  fullname: Khan, Abhimanyu
  email: abhimanyu.khan.research@gmail.com
  organization: Shiv Nadar University
BookMark eNp9kMtqwzAQRUVJoUnaH-hKP-BUz1iGbkpIHxDopl10JWRplMo4dpAfNH9fmXTVRVYDwz3D3LNAs6ZtAKF7SlaU0PVDtarA2RUjjKWF4JxdoTlVeZHRXPAZmqeQzKhSxQ1adF1FCJFM0jn62v4cwfbg8NCHOvQnPELshg7b4TDUpg8j4GNsuymE-29o4wmHBpsGw9jWiWkbk1aH1kGNW49LE_cmNKHZ36Jrb-oO7v7mEn0-bz82r9nu_eVt87TLLOe8z7hfW0WkEz4vGBdCMAeUMbkuDMjcApGlIt6VIpfeKSZKK7xz3IuyKFTJgC-ROt-16c0ugtc29GZ6rI8m1JoSPSnSlZ4U6UmRPitKKPuHHmM4pD6XocczBKnUGCDqzgZoLLgQkyTt2nAJ_wXAVYPw
CitedBy_id crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ejrh_2024_101758
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2024_06_039
crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4775575
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jedc_2024_104899
crossref_primary_10_4274_jems_2024_76993
Cites_doi 10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7
10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.002
10.2307/1914280
10.1257/jep.27.1.173
10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.005
10.1111/1467-937X.00119
10.2307/1907266
10.1016/0022-0531(81)90041-7
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01015.x
10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.014
10.2307/1907921
10.1111/geer.12160
10.1257/aer.20141141
10.2307/2951778
10.1006/jeth.1999.2574
10.1111/1467-937X.00068
10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.003
10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.007
10.1257/aer.97.4.1047
10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00015-X
10.1002/bdm.443
10.2307/2971721
10.1006/jeth.1995.1014
10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-J
10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.003
10.1007/s00186-018-0636-2
10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002
10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.009
10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004
10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.009
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.010
10.1007/BF01243036
10.2307/1913954
10.1007/s10726-006-9051-9
10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.001
10.1007/BF00122574
10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007
10.1007/s00182-010-0253-7
10.2307/1906951
10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006
10.1023/A:1019674323804
10.2307/1914185
10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.005
10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
10.3390/g9020031
10.2307/1914064
10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00006-9
10.1006/jeth.1993.1009
10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9
10.2307/2951777
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005
ContentType Journal Article
Copyright 2022 Elsevier B.V.
Copyright_xml – notice: 2022 Elsevier B.V.
DBID AAYXX
CITATION
DOI 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332
DatabaseName CrossRef
DatabaseTitle CrossRef
DatabaseTitleList
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Economics
EISSN 1879-1743
ExternalDocumentID 10_1016_j_jedc_2022_104332
S0165188922000379
GroupedDBID --K
--M
-~X
.L6
.~1
0R~
1B1
1OL
1RT
1~.
1~5
29K
3R3
4.4
457
4G.
5GY
5VS
63O
7-5
71M
8P~
9JN
9JO
AABNK
AACTN
AAEDT
AAEDW
AAFFL
AAIAV
AAIKJ
AAKOC
AALRI
AAOAW
AAPFB
AAQFI
AAQXK
AAXUO
ABAOU
ABFNM
ABFRF
ABJNI
ABLJU
ABMAC
ABTAH
ABXDB
ABYKQ
ACAZW
ACDAQ
ACGFO
ACGFS
ACHQT
ACRLP
ACROA
ADBBV
ADEZE
ADFHU
ADGUI
ADIYS
ADMUD
AEBSH
AEFWE
AEKER
AEYQN
AFFNX
AFKWA
AFODL
AFTJW
AGHFR
AGTHC
AGUBO
AGYEJ
AHHHB
AIEXJ
AIGVJ
AIIAU
AIKHN
AITUG
AJBFU
AJOXV
AJWLA
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
AMFUW
AMRAJ
ARUGR
ASPBG
AVWKF
AXJTR
AXLSJ
AZFZN
BEHZQ
BEZPJ
BGSCR
BKOJK
BKOMP
BLXMC
BNTGB
BPUDD
BULVW
BZJEE
CS3
D-I
DU5
EBS
EFJIC
EFLBG
EJD
EO8
EO9
EP2
EP3
F5P
FDB
FEDTE
FGOYB
FIRID
FNPLU
FYGXN
G-2
G-Q
GBLVA
HMB
HVGLF
HZ~
IHE
IXIXF
J1W
KOM
LPU
LY5
M41
MHUIS
MO0
MS~
N9A
O-L
O9-
OAUVE
OZT
P-8
P-9
P2P
PC.
PQQKQ
Q38
R2-
RIG
ROL
RPZ
SDF
SDG
SDP
SEB
SEE
SES
SEW
SPC
SPCBC
SSB
SSF
SSW
SSZ
T5K
TN5
ULY
UNMZH
UQL
WUQ
YK3
YQT
ZY4
~G-
AATTM
AAXKI
AAYWO
AAYXX
ABWVN
ACRPL
ACVFH
ADCNI
ADNMO
AEIPS
AEUPX
AFJKZ
AFPUW
AFXIZ
AGCQF
AGQPQ
AGRNS
AIGII
AIIUN
AKBMS
AKRWK
AKYEP
ANKPU
APXCP
BNPGV
CITATION
SSH
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-c333t-3f6c805d4f79234442de122569ae57ce05b80fdb475fd824bc4fdd3f4b998b2e3
IEDL.DBID .~1
ISSN 0165-1889
IngestDate Thu Apr 24 23:08:43 EDT 2025
Tue Jul 01 02:04:46 EDT 2025
Fri Feb 23 02:39:50 EST 2024
IsPeerReviewed true
IsScholarly true
Keywords D01
C78
Reference-dependent preference
Cumulative prospect theory
Probability-weighting
Loss-aversion
Bargaining
Evolution
D90
Expected utility
D81
C73
D83
Language English
LinkModel DirectLink
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c333t-3f6c805d4f79234442de122569ae57ce05b80fdb475fd824bc4fdd3f4b998b2e3
ParticipantIDs crossref_citationtrail_10_1016_j_jedc_2022_104332
crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jedc_2022_104332
elsevier_sciencedirect_doi_10_1016_j_jedc_2022_104332
ProviderPackageCode CITATION
AAYXX
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate April 2022
2022-04-00
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2022-04-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 04
  year: 2022
  text: April 2022
PublicationDecade 2020
PublicationTitle Journal of economic dynamics & control
PublicationYear 2022
Publisher Elsevier B.V
Publisher_xml – name: Elsevier B.V
References Gossner, Steiner (bib0015) 2018; 177
Vartiainen (bib0050) 2007; 58
Sawa (bib0044) 2021; 184
Hwang, Lim, Neary, Newton (bib0020) 2018; 110
Kőszegi, Rabin (bib0031) 2007; 97
Bozbay, Dietrich, Peters (bib0006) 2012; 74
Young (bib0055) 1998; 65
Ellison (bib0010) 2000; 67
Quiggin (bib0041) 1982; 3
Kandori, Mailath, Rob (bib0027) 1993; 61
Sawa, Wu (bib0046) 2018; 76
Compte, Jehiel (bib0008) 2003
Young (bib0054) 1993; 59
Herold, Netzer (bib0018) 2015
Sawa, Wu (bib0045) 2018; 112
Nax, Newton (bib0037) 2019; 116
Barron, Erev (bib58) 2003; 16
Rozen (bib0042) 2013; 87
Sawa (bib0043) 2019; 113
Kandori, Rob (bib0028) 1995; 65
Barberis (bib0005) 2013; 27
Newton (bib0038) 2012; 75
Hwang, Rey-Bellet (bib0021) 2021; 126
Tversky, Kahneman (bib56) 1973; 5
Huck, Kirchsteiger, Oechssler (bib0019) 2005; 115
Young (bib0053) 1993; 61
Shalev (bib0047) 2002; 52
Guth (bib0016) 1995; 24
Gimpel (bib0014) 2007; 16
Driesen, Perea, Peters (bib0009) 2012; 64
Freidlin, Wentzell (bib0012) 1984
Wakker (bib0051) 2010
Nash (bib0035) 1953; 21
Steiner, Stewart (bib0048) 2016; 106
Thomson (bib0049) 1981; 25
Newton (bib0040) 2018; 9
Kalai, Smorodinsky (bib0026) 1975; 43
Allais (bib0003) 1953; 21
Karagözoğlu, Keskin (bib0029) 2018; 88
Agastya (bib0002) 1999; 89
Agastya (bib0001) 1997; 64
Wallace, Young (bib0052) 2015; Vol. 4
Brito, Buoncristiani, Intriligator (bib0007) 1977; 45
Foster, Young (bib0011) 1990; 38
Friedman (bib0013) 1989; 79
Kahneman, Tversky (bib0023) 1979; 47
Newton (bib0039) 2012; 147
Hyndman (bib0022) 2011; 40
Naidu, Hwang, Bowles (bib0033) 2010; 109
Tversky, Kahneman (bib57) 1974; 185
Tversky, Kahneman (bib0024) 1992; 5
Kalai (bib0025) 1977; 45
Guth, Yaari (bib0017) 1992
Kőszegi, Rabin (bib0030) 2006; 121
Li (bib0032) 2007; 136
Arnold, Schwalbe (bib0004) 2002; 49
Nash (bib0034) 1950; 18
Nax (bib0036) 2018; 20
Sawa (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0045) 2018; 112
Karagözoğlu (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0029) 2018; 88
Naidu (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0033) 2010; 109
Tversky (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib56) 1973; 5
Barberis (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0005) 2013; 27
Sawa (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0043) 2019; 113
Hwang (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0021) 2021; 126
Young (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0053) 1993; 61
Arnold (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0004) 2002; 49
Kandori (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0028) 1995; 65
Wallace (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0052) 2015; Vol. 4
Guth (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0016) 1995; 24
Sawa (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0044) 2021; 184
Newton (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0040) 2018; 9
Agastya (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0001) 1997; 64
Quiggin (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0041) 1982; 3
Gimpel (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0014) 2007; 16
Young (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0054) 1993; 59
Rozen (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0042) 2013; 87
Agastya (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0002) 1999; 89
Young (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0055) 1998; 65
Kőszegi (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0030) 2006; 121
Wakker (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0051) 2010
Shalev (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0047) 2002; 52
Guth (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0017) 1992
Nax (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0036) 2018; 20
Allais (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0003) 1953; 21
Gossner (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0015) 2018; 177
Hwang (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0020) 2018; 110
Hyndman (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0022) 2011; 40
Kandori (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0027) 1993; 61
Nax (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0037) 2019; 116
Tversky (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0024) 1992; 5
Tversky (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib57) 1974; 185
Friedman (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0013) 1989; 79
Steiner (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0048) 2016; 106
Herold (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0018) 2015
Bozbay (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0006) 2012; 74
Brito (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0007) 1977; 45
Newton (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0038) 2012; 75
Newton (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0039) 2012; 147
Kahneman (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0023) 1979; 47
Foster (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0011) 1990; 38
Vartiainen (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0050) 2007; 58
Freidlin (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0012) 1984
Li (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0032) 2007; 136
Compte (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0008) 2003
Driesen (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0009) 2012; 64
Thomson (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0049) 1981; 25
Sawa (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0046) 2018; 76
Ellison (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0010) 2000; 67
Nash (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0035) 1953; 21
Kalai (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0025) 1977; 45
Barron (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib58) 2003; 16
Huck (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0019) 2005; 115
Nash (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0034) 1950; 18
Kalai (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0026) 1975; 43
Kőszegi (10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0031) 2007; 97
References_xml – volume: 109
  start-page: 31
  year: 2010
  end-page: 33
  ident: bib0033
  article-title: Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
  publication-title: Econ Lett
– volume: 115
  start-page: 689
  year: 2005
  end-page: 702
  ident: bib0019
  article-title: Learning to like what you have: explaining the endowment effect
  publication-title: The Economic Journal
– volume: 88
  start-page: 283
  year: 2018
  end-page: 295
  ident: bib0029
  article-title: Endogenous reference points in bargaining
  publication-title: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
– year: 1984
  ident: bib0012
  article-title: Random perturbations of dynamical systems
– volume: 67
  start-page: 17
  year: 2000
  end-page: 45
  ident: bib0010
  article-title: Basins of attraction, long run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution
  publication-title: Review of Economic Studies
– volume: 110
  start-page: 273
  year: 2018
  end-page: 298
  ident: bib0020
  article-title: Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– volume: 126
  start-page: 355
  year: 2021
  end-page: 373
  ident: bib0021
  article-title: Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– volume: 87
  start-page: 35
  year: 2013
  end-page: 42
  ident: bib0042
  article-title: Conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
– volume: 64
  start-page: 103
  year: 2012
  end-page: 118
  ident: bib0009
  article-title: Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
  publication-title: Math Soc Sci
– volume: 18
  start-page: 155
  year: 1950
  end-page: 162
  ident: bib0034
  article-title: The bargaining problem
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 40
  start-page: 527
  year: 2011
  end-page: 549
  ident: bib0022
  article-title: Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences
  publication-title: International Journal of Game Theory
– volume: 116
  start-page: 179
  year: 2019
  end-page: 184
  ident: bib0037
  article-title: Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– volume: 25
  start-page: 431
  year: 1981
  end-page: 441
  ident: bib0049
  article-title: A class of solutions to bargaining problems
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 89
  start-page: 207
  year: 1999
  end-page: 233
  ident: bib0002
  article-title: Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 5
  start-page: 297
  year: 1992
  end-page: 323
  ident: bib0024
  article-title: Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
  publication-title: J Risk Uncertain
– volume: 136
  start-page: 695
  year: 2007
  end-page: 708
  ident: bib0032
  article-title: Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 21
  start-page: 128
  year: 1953
  end-page: 140
  ident: bib0035
  article-title: Two-person cooperative games
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 112
  start-page: 98
  year: 2018
  end-page: 124
  ident: bib0045
  article-title: Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– volume: 106
  start-page: 1601
  year: 2016
  end-page: 1631
  ident: bib0048
  article-title: Perceiving prospects properly
  publication-title: American Economic Review
– volume: 58
  start-page: 172
  year: 2007
  end-page: 180
  ident: bib0050
  article-title: Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– year: 2010
  ident: bib0051
  article-title: Prospect theory: For risk and ambiguity
– volume: Vol. 4
  start-page: 327
  year: 2015
  end-page: 380
  ident: bib0052
  article-title: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
  publication-title: Handbook of Game Theory and Economic Applications
– volume: 65
  start-page: 383
  year: 1995
  end-page: 414
  ident: bib0028
  article-title: Evolution of equilibria in the long run: a general theory and applications
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 27
  start-page: 173
  year: 2013
  end-page: 196
  ident: bib0005
  article-title: Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: a review and assessment
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Perspectives
– volume: 97
  start-page: 1047
  year: 2007
  end-page: 1073
  ident: bib0031
  article-title: Reference-dependent risk attitudes
  publication-title: American Economic Review
– volume: 3
  start-page: 323
  year: 1982
  end-page: 343
  ident: bib0041
  article-title: A theory of anticipated utility
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation
– volume: 64
  start-page: 411
  year: 1997
  end-page: 426
  ident: bib0001
  article-title: Adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations
  publication-title: Review of Economic Studies
– volume: 47
  start-page: 263
  year: 1979
  end-page: 292
  ident: bib0023
  article-title: Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 9
  start-page: 31
  year: 2018
  ident: bib0040
  article-title: Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
  publication-title: Games
– volume: 52
  start-page: 201
  year: 2002
  end-page: 232
  ident: bib0047
  article-title: Loss aversion and bargaining
  publication-title: Theory Decis
– year: 2015
  ident: bib0018
  article-title: Second-best Probability Weighting
  publication-title: Working paper
– volume: 74
  start-page: 407
  year: 2012
  end-page: 417
  ident: bib0006
  article-title: Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– volume: 121
  start-page: 1133
  year: 2006
  end-page: 1166
  ident: bib0030
  article-title: A model of reference-dependent preferences
  publication-title: Quarterly Journal of Economics
– volume: 38
  start-page: 219
  year: 1990
  end-page: 232
  ident: bib0011
  article-title: Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
  publication-title: Theor Popul Biol
– volume: 61
  start-page: 29
  year: 1993
  end-page: 56
  ident: bib0027
  article-title: Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 59
  start-page: 145
  year: 1993
  end-page: 168
  ident: bib0054
  article-title: An evolutionary model of bargaining
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 5
  start-page: 207
  year: 1973
  end-page: 232
  ident: bib56
  article-title: Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
  publication-title: Cognitive Psychology
– start-page: 23
  year: 1992
  end-page: 34
  ident: bib0017
  article-title: Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in a Simple Strategic Game: An Evolutionary Approach
  publication-title: Explaining Process and Change – Approaches to Evolutionary Economics
– volume: 147
  start-page: 364
  year: 2012
  end-page: 381
  ident: bib0039
  article-title: Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 113
  start-page: 633
  year: 2019
  end-page: 650
  ident: bib0043
  article-title: Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
  publication-title: Games and Economic Behaviour
– volume: 16
  start-page: 215
  year: 2003
  end-page: 233
  ident: bib58
  article-title: Small Feedback-based Decisions and Their Limited Correspondence to Description-based Decisions
  publication-title: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
– volume: 79
  start-page: 1243
  year: 1989
  end-page: 1248
  ident: bib0013
  article-title: The s-shaped value function as a constrained optimum
  publication-title: American Economic Review
– volume: 45
  start-page: 1163
  year: 1977
  end-page: 1172
  ident: bib0007
  article-title: A new approach to the nash bargaining problem
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 177
  start-page: 816
  year: 2018
  end-page: 847
  ident: bib0015
  article-title: On the cost of misperception: general results and behavioral applications
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
– volume: 21
  start-page: 503
  year: 1953
  end-page: 546
  ident: bib0003
  article-title: Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 16
  start-page: 303
  year: 2007
  end-page: 319
  ident: bib0014
  article-title: Loss aversion and reference-dependent preferences in multi-attribute negotiations
  publication-title: Group Decision and Negotiation
– volume: 20
  start-page: 243
  year: 2018
  end-page: 256
  ident: bib0036
  article-title: Uncoupled aspiration adaptation dynamics into the core
  publication-title: German Economic Review
– volume: 49
  start-page: 363
  year: 2002
  end-page: 380
  ident: bib0004
  article-title: Dynamic coalition formation and the core
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation
– volume: 75
  start-page: 842
  year: 2012
  end-page: 854
  ident: bib0038
  article-title: Coalitional stochastic stability
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
– volume: 65
  start-page: 773
  year: 1998
  end-page: 792
  ident: bib0055
  article-title: Conventional contracts
  publication-title: Rev Econ Stud
– volume: 61
  start-page: 57
  year: 1993
  end-page: 84
  ident: bib0053
  article-title: The evolution of conventions
  publication-title: Econometrica
– year: 2003
  ident: bib0008
  article-title: Bargaining with reference dependent preferences
– volume: 43
  start-page: 513
  year: 1975
  end-page: 518
  ident: bib0026
  article-title: Other solutions to nash’s bargaining problem
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 76
  start-page: 96
  year: 2018
  end-page: 104
  ident: bib0046
  article-title: Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
  publication-title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
– volume: 184
  start-page: 692
  year: 2021
  end-page: 711
  ident: bib0044
  article-title: A prospect theory nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
– volume: 24
  start-page: 323
  year: 1995
  end-page: 344
  ident: bib0016
  article-title: An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
  publication-title: International Journal of Game Theory
– volume: 45
  start-page: 1623
  year: 1977
  end-page: 1630
  ident: bib0025
  article-title: Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility comparisons
  publication-title: Econometrica
– volume: 185
  start-page: 1124
  year: 1974
  end-page: 1131
  ident: bib57
  article-title: Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
  publication-title: Science
– volume: 3
  start-page: 323
  issue: 4
  year: 1982
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0041
  article-title: A theory of anticipated utility
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation
  doi: 10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7
– volume: 76
  start-page: 96
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0046
  article-title: Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
  publication-title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
  doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.002
– volume: 121
  start-page: 1133
  issue: 4
  year: 2006
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0030
  article-title: A model of reference-dependent preferences
  publication-title: Quarterly Journal of Economics
– volume: 43
  start-page: 513
  issue: 3
  year: 1975
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0026
  article-title: Other solutions to nash’s bargaining problem
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1914280
– year: 2010
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0051
– volume: 27
  start-page: 173
  issue: 1
  year: 2013
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0005
  article-title: Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: a review and assessment
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Perspectives
  doi: 10.1257/jep.27.1.173
– volume: 58
  start-page: 172
  issue: 1
  year: 2007
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0050
  article-title: Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.005
– volume: 67
  start-page: 17
  issue: 1
  year: 2000
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0010
  article-title: Basins of attraction, long run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution
  publication-title: Review of Economic Studies
  doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00119
– volume: 18
  start-page: 155
  issue: 2
  year: 1950
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0034
  article-title: The bargaining problem
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1907266
– volume: 25
  start-page: 431
  issue: 3
  year: 1981
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0049
  article-title: A class of solutions to bargaining problems
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(81)90041-7
– volume: 115
  start-page: 689
  issue: 505
  year: 2005
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0019
  article-title: Learning to like what you have: explaining the endowment effect
  publication-title: The Economic Journal
  doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01015.x
– volume: 75
  start-page: 842
  issue: 2
  year: 2012
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0038
  article-title: Coalitional stochastic stability
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.014
– volume: 21
  start-page: 503
  issue: 4
  year: 1953
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0003
  article-title: Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1907921
– volume: 20
  start-page: 243
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0036
  article-title: Uncoupled aspiration adaptation dynamics into the core
  publication-title: German Economic Review
  doi: 10.1111/geer.12160
– volume: 106
  start-page: 1601
  issue: 7
  year: 2016
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0048
  article-title: Perceiving prospects properly
  publication-title: American Economic Review
  doi: 10.1257/aer.20141141
– volume: 61
  start-page: 57
  issue: 1
  year: 1993
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0053
  article-title: The evolution of conventions
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/2951778
– volume: 89
  start-page: 207
  issue: 2
  year: 1999
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0002
  article-title: Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2574
– volume: 65
  start-page: 773
  issue: 4
  year: 1998
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0055
  article-title: Conventional contracts
  publication-title: Rev Econ Stud
  doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00068
– volume: 177
  start-page: 816
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0015
  article-title: On the cost of misperception: general results and behavioral applications
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.003
– volume: 147
  start-page: 364
  issue: 1
  year: 2012
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0039
  article-title: Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.007
– year: 2003
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0008
– volume: 97
  start-page: 1047
  issue: 4
  year: 2007
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0031
  article-title: Reference-dependent risk attitudes
  publication-title: American Economic Review
  doi: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1047
– volume: 49
  start-page: 363
  issue: 3
  year: 2002
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0004
  article-title: Dynamic coalition formation and the core
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation
  doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00015-X
– volume: 16
  start-page: 215
  issue: 3
  year: 2003
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib58
  article-title: Small Feedback-based Decisions and Their Limited Correspondence to Description-based Decisions
  publication-title: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
  doi: 10.1002/bdm.443
– year: 2015
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0018
  article-title: Second-best Probability Weighting
– volume: 64
  start-page: 411
  issue: 3
  year: 1997
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0001
  article-title: Adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations
  publication-title: Review of Economic Studies
  doi: 10.2307/2971721
– volume: 65
  start-page: 383
  issue: 2
  year: 1995
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0028
  article-title: Evolution of equilibria in the long run: a general theory and applications
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1006/jeth.1995.1014
– volume: 38
  start-page: 219
  issue: 2
  year: 1990
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0011
  article-title: Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
  publication-title: Theor Popul Biol
  doi: 10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-J
– volume: 126
  start-page: 355
  year: 2021
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0021
  article-title: Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.003
– volume: 88
  start-page: 283
  issue: 2
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0029
  article-title: Endogenous reference points in bargaining
  publication-title: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
  doi: 10.1007/s00186-018-0636-2
– volume: 110
  start-page: 273
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0020
  article-title: Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002
– volume: 113
  start-page: 633
  year: 2019
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0043
  article-title: Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
  publication-title: Games and Economic Behaviour
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.009
– volume: 136
  start-page: 695
  issue: 1
  year: 2007
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0032
  article-title: Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004
– volume: 184
  start-page: 692
  year: 2021
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0044
  article-title: A prospect theory nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
  doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.009
– volume: 64
  start-page: 103
  issue: 2
  year: 2012
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0009
  article-title: Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
  publication-title: Math Soc Sci
  doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.010
– volume: 24
  start-page: 323
  issue: 4
  year: 1995
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0016
  article-title: An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
  publication-title: International Journal of Game Theory
  doi: 10.1007/BF01243036
– volume: 45
  start-page: 1623
  issue: 7
  year: 1977
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0025
  article-title: Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility comparisons
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1913954
– year: 1984
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0012
– volume: 16
  start-page: 303
  issue: 4
  year: 2007
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0014
  article-title: Loss aversion and reference-dependent preferences in multi-attribute negotiations
  publication-title: Group Decision and Negotiation
  doi: 10.1007/s10726-006-9051-9
– volume: 116
  start-page: 179
  year: 2019
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0037
  article-title: Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.001
– volume: 5
  start-page: 297
  year: 1992
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0024
  article-title: Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
  publication-title: J Risk Uncertain
  doi: 10.1007/BF00122574
– volume: 74
  start-page: 407
  issue: 1
  year: 2012
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0006
  article-title: Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007
– volume: 40
  start-page: 527
  issue: 3
  year: 2011
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0022
  article-title: Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences
  publication-title: International Journal of Game Theory
  doi: 10.1007/s00182-010-0253-7
– volume: 21
  start-page: 128
  issue: 1
  year: 1953
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0035
  article-title: Two-person cooperative games
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1906951
– volume: 112
  start-page: 98
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0045
  article-title: Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
  publication-title: Games Econ Behav
  doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006
– volume: 79
  start-page: 1243
  issue: 5
  year: 1989
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0013
  article-title: The s-shaped value function as a constrained optimum
  publication-title: American Economic Review
– start-page: 23
  year: 1992
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0017
  article-title: Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in a Simple Strategic Game: An Evolutionary Approach
– volume: 52
  start-page: 201
  issue: 3
  year: 2002
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0047
  article-title: Loss aversion and bargaining
  publication-title: Theory Decis
  doi: 10.1023/A:1019674323804
– volume: 47
  start-page: 263
  issue: 2
  year: 1979
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0023
  article-title: Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1914185
– volume: 87
  start-page: 35
  year: 2013
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0042
  article-title: Conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining
  publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
  doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.005
– volume: 185
  start-page: 1124
  year: 1974
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib57
  article-title: Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
  publication-title: Science
  doi: 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
– volume: 9
  start-page: 31
  issue: 2
  year: 2018
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0040
  article-title: Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
  publication-title: Games
  doi: 10.3390/g9020031
– volume: 45
  start-page: 1163
  issue: 5
  year: 1977
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0007
  article-title: A new approach to the nash bargaining problem
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/1914064
– volume: Vol. 4
  start-page: 327
  year: 2015
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0052
  article-title: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
  doi: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00006-9
– volume: 59
  start-page: 145
  issue: 1
  year: 1993
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0054
  article-title: An evolutionary model of bargaining
  publication-title: J Econ Theory
  doi: 10.1006/jeth.1993.1009
– volume: 5
  start-page: 207
  issue: 2
  year: 1973
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib56
  article-title: Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
  publication-title: Cognitive Psychology
  doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9
– volume: 61
  start-page: 29
  issue: 1
  year: 1993
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0027
  article-title: Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games
  publication-title: Econometrica
  doi: 10.2307/2951777
– volume: 109
  start-page: 31
  issue: 1
  year: 2010
  ident: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332_bib0033
  article-title: Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
  publication-title: Econ Lett
  doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005
SSID ssj0005251
Score 2.357712
Snippet I examine the effect of decision-making processes on the dynamics of bargaining over a fixed pie by comparing the share received when individuals are subject...
SourceID crossref
elsevier
SourceType Enrichment Source
Index Database
Publisher
StartPage 104332
SubjectTerms Bargaining
Cumulative prospect theory
Evolution
Expected utility
Loss-aversion
Probability-weighting
Reference-dependent preference
Title Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
URI https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332
Volume 137
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV1JS8NAFB5KPehFXLEuZQ7eJDaZJZkcS7FUhV60UE8hs0GLxmIX8OJvd95kIgriwWOGeRAebwv5vvchdKldkxOZZJEolYxYEguXc4rDIFdq10Fyl1OAthinowm7m_JpCw0aLgzAKkPtr2u6r9bhpBe82VvMZr0HIOIkQuSE-C0qQOJjLIMov_74DvPgtSZhyiO4HYgzNcZrbjSsMSQEfnVSSn5vTt8aznAP7YZJEffrl9lHLVMdoO2GSLw8RE-wpli5iRG74IFpGgPEYr3Eav3iRbk2Brv66LmU2BMW3_GswmWFzSYEXOmOvBYOfrVYguat14s4QpPhzeNgFAWlhEhRSlcRtakSMdfMwjpAxhjRJnGZmual4ZkyMZcitlqyjFstCJOKWa2pZdJ9bUli6DFqV6-VOUGYpdoqnSe5zGFYi6UtWSliIvM0SxMpOihpXFSosEYc1CyeiwYvNi_ArQW4tajd2kFXXzaLeonGn7d54_niRygUrsr_YXf6T7sztANPNRznHLVXb2tz4SaNlez6UOqirf7t_Wj8Cdi_0rw
linkProvider Elsevier
linkToHtml http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV1JS8NAFB5qPdSLuGJd5-BNYpPJTDJzlGKpWnuxhXoKmQ1aNC12AS_-dudlkQrSg9fJPAiPt4V87_sQutauyfFYUo-nSno08LnLOcVgkEu16yDC5RSgLfpRd0gfR2xUQ-1qFwZglWXtL2p6Xq3Lk1bpzdZsPG69wCJOwLkgJGdREVtom7r0BRmD2691nAcrRAkj5sH1cnOmAHlNjAYeQ0LgX2cYkr-701rH6eyh3XJUxHfF2-yjmskOUKPaJJ4folfgKVZuZMQuemCcxoCxWM6xWr7nqlwrg12BzJcpcb6x-InHGU4zbFZlxKXuKBfDwVOLJYje5oIRR2jYuR-0u14pleCpMAwXXmgjxX2mqQU-QEop0SZwqRqJ1LBYGZ9J7lstacys5oRKRa3WoaXSfW5JYsJjVM-mmTlBmEbaKi0CIQVMa760KU25T6SI4iiQvImCykWJKnnEQc7iLakAY5ME3JqAW5PCrU1082MzK1g0Nt5mleeTX7GQuDK_we70n3ZXqNEdPPeS3kP_6QztwJMCm3OO6ouPpblwY8dCXuZh9Q3Tt9RK
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Expected+utility+versus+cumulative+prospect+theory+in+an+evolutionary+model+of+bargaining&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+economic+dynamics+%26+control&rft.au=Khan%2C+Abhimanyu&rft.date=2022-04-01&rft.pub=Elsevier+B.V&rft.issn=0165-1889&rft.eissn=1879-1743&rft.volume=137&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016%2Fj.jedc.2022.104332&rft.externalDocID=S0165188922000379
thumbnail_l http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0165-1889&client=summon
thumbnail_m http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0165-1889&client=summon
thumbnail_s http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0165-1889&client=summon