Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations

We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Behavioral and brain sciences Vol. 43; p. e57
Main Authors Anderson, Rajen A, Ruisch, Benjamin C, Pizarro, David A
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published England Cambridge University Press 01.01.2020
Subjects
Culture
Humans
Judgment
Moral Obligations
Morality
Morals
Violations
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Summary:We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.
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ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X19002589