Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
This paper studies mechanism design when agents have belief-dependent preferences, in that utilities depend on the agents' hierarchical posterior beliefs about types. For instance, agents may be subject to temptation, shame, image concerns, or privacy concerns. In this setting, the textbook rev...
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| Published in | Journal of economic theory Vol. 216; p. 105782 |
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| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
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01.03.2024
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| Abstract | This paper studies mechanism design when agents have belief-dependent preferences, in that utilities depend on the agents' hierarchical posterior beliefs about types. For instance, agents may be subject to temptation, shame, image concerns, or privacy concerns. In this setting, the textbook revelation principle does not hold, since mechanisms can provide agents with information that affects posterior beliefs. This paper uses a psychological game framework suited for mechanism design, and provides a novel version of the revelation principle for belief-dependent preferences. The new revelation principle makes use of extended direct mechanisms that map each reported type into material outcomes and private suggestions of what posterior beliefs the agents should have. The paper shows that it suffices to use extended direct mechanisms that satisfy three conditions: Bayesian incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and a new condition called believability. The new revelation principle is used to find revenue-maximizing auctions when bidders have different types of image concerns. Moreover, it provides an alternate tool—distinct from Myerson's communication revelation principle—to study mechanism design with after-games. |
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| AbstractList | This paper studies mechanism design when agents have belief-dependent preferences, in that utilities depend on the agents' hierarchical posterior beliefs about types. For instance, agents may be subject to temptation, shame, image concerns, or privacy concerns. In this setting, the textbook revelation principle does not hold, since mechanisms can provide agents with information that affects posterior beliefs. This paper uses a psychological game framework suited for mechanism design, and provides a novel version of the revelation principle for belief-dependent preferences. The new revelation principle makes use of extended direct mechanisms that map each reported type into material outcomes and private suggestions of what posterior beliefs the agents should have. The paper shows that it suffices to use extended direct mechanisms that satisfy three conditions: Bayesian incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and a new condition called believability. The new revelation principle is used to find revenue-maximizing auctions when bidders have different types of image concerns. Moreover, it provides an alternate tool—distinct from Myerson's communication revelation principle—to study mechanism design with after-games. |
| ArticleNumber | 105782 |
| Author | Rivera Mora, Ernesto |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Ernesto orcidid: 0000-0002-2627-4013 surname: Rivera Mora fullname: Rivera Mora, Ernesto email: ernesto.riveramora@yale.edu organization: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, P.O. Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520, United States of America |
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| Cites_doi | 10.3982/ECTA16846 10.1006/jeth.1993.1012 10.1515/bejte-2012-0003 10.2307/1914083 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00020.x 10.1093/restud/rdaa041 10.2307/2951491 10.1080/01621459.1965.10480775 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.009 10.1257/aer.20221247 10.1111/1468-0262.00252 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.007 10.3982/ECTA15768 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.004 10.1257/jel.20201378 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4 10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.001 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.005 10.3982/TE674 10.1257/aer.97.4.1047 10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004 10.2307/1884281 10.1257/aer.99.3.909 10.1145/2509013.2509016 10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 10.1257/mic.20140056 10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.4.673 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5 10.2307/2297045 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.003 10.1111/jems.12406 10.1257/mic.20160247 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.009 10.1086/705332 10.1287/moor.6.1.58 10.1111/iere.12067 10.2307/1912346 |
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| Keywords | Revelation principle Auctions with image concerns D91 Psychological game theory Belief-dependent preferences Mechanism design with after-games D82 |
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| SubjectTerms | Auctions with image concerns Belief-dependent preferences Mechanism design with after-games Psychological game theory Revelation principle |
| Title | Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences |
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