Heterogeneous trembles and model selection in the strategy frequency estimation method

The strategy frequency estimation method (Dal Bó and Fréchette in Am Econ Rev 101(1):411-429, 2011; Fudenberg in Am Econ Rev 102(2):720-749, 2012) allows us to estimate the fraction of subjects playing each of a list of strategies in an infinitely repeated game. Currently, this method assumes that s...

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Published inJournal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 6; no. 2; pp. 113 - 124
Main Author Bland, James R.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.12.2020
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
C52
Prisoner’s dilemma
Strategy frequency estimation method
C57
Model selection
C15
Mixture model
Trembles
C73
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Abstract The strategy frequency estimation method (Dal Bó and Fréchette in Am Econ Rev 101(1):411-429, 2011; Fudenberg in Am Econ Rev 102(2):720-749, 2012) allows us to estimate the fraction of subjects playing each of a list of strategies in an infinitely repeated game. Currently, this method assumes that subjects tremble with the same probability. This paper extends this method, so that subjects’ trembles can be heterogeneous. Out of 60 ex ante plausible specifications, the selected model uses the six strategies described in Dal Bó and Fréchette ( 2018 ), and allows the distribution of trembles to vary by strategy.
AbstractList The strategy frequency estimation method (Dal Bó and Fréchette in Am Econ Rev 101(1):411-429, 2011; Fudenberg in Am Econ Rev 102(2):720-749, 2012) allows us to estimate the fraction of subjects playing each of a list of strategies in an infinitely repeated game. Currently, this method assumes that subjects tremble with the same probability. This paper extends this method, so that subjects’ trembles can be heterogeneous. Out of 60 ex ante plausible specifications, the selected model uses the six strategies described in Dal Bó and Fréchette ( 2018 ), and allows the distribution of trembles to vary by strategy.
The strategy frequency estimation method (Dal Bó and Fréchette in Am Econ Rev 101(1):411-429, 2011; Fudenberg in Am Econ Rev 102(2):720-749, 2012) allows us to estimate the fraction of subjects playing each of a list of strategies in an infinitely repeated game. Currently, this method assumes that subjects tremble with the same probability. This paper extends this method, so that subjects’ trembles can be heterogeneous. Out of 60 ex ante plausible specifications, the selected model uses the six strategies described in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018), and allows the distribution of trembles to vary by strategy.
Author Bland, James R.
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Cites_doi 10.1007/s10683-016-9494-z
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00704.x
10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.013
10.1257/aer.101.1.411
10.1257/aer.20181480
10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y
10.1257/jel.20160980
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.02.008
10.1257/aer.102.2.720
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Keywords C52
Prisoner’s dilemma
Strategy frequency estimation method
C57
Model selection
C15
Mixture model
Trembles
C73
Language English
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Aoyagi, Bhaskar, Fréchette (CR1) 2019; 11
CR5
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Sherstyuk, Tarui, Saijo (CR10) 2013; 16
Fréchette, Yuksel (CR6) 2017; 20
S2199678420002673_CR7
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S2199678420002673_CR10
S2199678420002673_CR11
Aoyagi (S2199678420002673_CR1) 2019; 11
S2199678420002673_CR9
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Snippet The strategy frequency estimation method (Dal Bó and Fréchette in Am Econ Rev 101(1):411-429, 2011; Fudenberg in Am Econ Rev 102(2):720-749, 2012) allows us to...
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SubjectTerms Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
Title Heterogeneous trembles and model selection in the strategy frequency estimation method
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