A-equilibrium and fuzzy A-core in pure exchange model with externalities

The paper suggests the concept of A -equilibrium that is a concretization of the “altruistic” Berge equilibrium adapted to the pure exchange models with externalities. In contrast to the classical markets, these models consider the external influence on the preferences of economic agents. In terms o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAutomation and remote control Vol. 77; no. 11; pp. 2080 - 2089
Main Author Vasil’ev, V. A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Moscow Pleiades Publishing 01.11.2016
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Allocations
CAE) and Design
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control; Optimization
Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD
Control
Economic models
Economics
Equilibrium
Equivalence
Exchange
Externalities
Fuzzy
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Mechanical Engineering
Mechatronics
Remote control
Robotics
Systems Theory
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Summary:The paper suggests the concept of A -equilibrium that is a concretization of the “altruistic” Berge equilibrium adapted to the pure exchange models with externalities. In contrast to the classical markets, these models consider the external influence on the preferences of economic agents. In terms of an appropriate fuzzy domination, a cooperative characterization of the A -equilibrium allocations is given, and an analog of the classic core equivalence theorem is established.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:0005-1179
1608-3032
DOI:10.1134/S0005117916110151